Abstract:
The recent spread of COVID-19 across the U.S. led to concerted efforts by states to "flatten the curve" through the adoption of stay-at-home mandates that encourage individuals to reduce travel and maintain social distance and indeed using data on travel activity we find that residents start reducing mobility early in most states. Combining data on changes in travel activity with COVID-19 health outcomes and variation in state policy adoption, we characterize the direct impact of stay-at-home mandates on mobility and social distancing and link these behavioral changes to health benefits. We find evidence of dramatic declines in mobility nationwide prior to the adoption of statewide mandates. Despite these early reductions, we find that statewide stay-at-home policies induced "mandate effects" of between 4.1 and 5.9 percentage point declines relative to pre-COVID-19 levels for the first four states to introduce such policies. These effects persist when considering all states' mandates and alternate estimation strategies that account for states' differences in travel behavior prior to policy adoption. Using previous changes in mobility, we find significant effects on current mortality, with a 1% reduction in visits to non-essential businesses weeks prior associated with 9.2 fewer deaths per 100 million per day, corresponding to over 74,000 lives saved nationwide for the months of March and April 2020. This suggests death tolls would have been nearly 2.3 times their actual counts during these months without these behavior changes. These averted deaths correspond with estimated economic benefits between $249-$745 billion for observed behavioral changes in March and April. These estimates represent a lower bound of direct health benefits, as they do not account for spillovers or undercounting of COVID-19 mortality. Observed reductions in mobility indeed contributed to flattening the curve and reduced the strain on the medical system during those two months. Our findings provide evidence that statewide stay-at-home ordinances induce additional social distancing, and ultimately attenuate the negative health consequences of COVID-19, revealing themselves as important policy tools in the fight against pandemic. Further, substantial reductions in mobility prior to state-level policies convey important policy implications for re-opening.

Take Aways:
Our study uses cellphone mobility data to measure changes in distances traveled, rates of unique human encounters, and counts of visits to non-essential businesses relative to the beginning of the year before the spread of COVID-19 in the United States which we use to look at the effects of state-level stay-at-home mandates. In the first part of our paper, we conduct analysis focusing on describing these changes in mobility patterns; what we find is striking evidence of very large reductions in all measures of travel activity even before state mandates came into effect.
The above figure plots changes in the three mobility measures over time, with average changes relative to pre-COVID-19 levels reported for each of three groups of states: the solid line for the first four to implement statewide mandates (CA, IL, NJ, and NY), dotted for later adopters of statewide policies, and dashed for the eight states that never adopted statewide policies. The vertical line marks March 19, the date the first statewide policy came into effect in California.

The data show that across the country people were staying home and avoiding unnecessary trips to retailers well in advance of their statewide mandates. In fact, visits to non-essential businesses had already reached close to its floor by the time the first state policy came into effect. Given that people were avoiding local businesses en-masse before state mandates, these policies shouldn't be blamed for all the economic decline. The historic pandemic rightfully deserves some of this blame for lost business and resulting unemployment.

After discussing trends in the data, we employ more advanced statistical techniques to identify the causal impact of statewide stay-at-home policies on behavioral changes in mobility. We find that, once a states' mandate entered into effect, residents of that state further reduced their average distances traveled by between 6.5 and 7.3, non-essential visits by 4.1 to 4.4, and unique human encounter rates by 5.0 to 5.9 percentage points. Critically, these reductions came after mobility had already been reduced by more than half of normal levels. As a result, any effect of mandates that we measure is conditional on prior behavioral changes - our estimates are clearly an understatement of the effect these policies would have had if they had been rolled
out earlier in the pandemic, before individuals had already modified their behavior so extensively. Our results indicate that even in this complicated world, states’ stay-at-home policies had their intended effect and were able to reach a group of people who had not previously responded to local policies or internalized the risk of pandemic. Further, we only measure the direct impact of state policies on residents of that state. We do not take into account any spillovers (i.e. residents of other states deciding to stay home after learning about California’s mandate) or earlier local policies or changes to school or work scenarios, and therefore further understate the true effect of how individuals responded to the full set of COVID-19 policies.

Additionally, our benefit calculations are by no means a complete estimate of even the total health benefits of these policies. The value we estimate is the health benefit associated only with averted deaths from COVID-19 (accounting for the demographics of those most affected by the pandemic). The numbers we present do not take into account savings due to reduced hospitalizations, lowered strain on the medical system, or improvements to individual welfare due to averted cases. The estimates that we present are only part of the economic benefits due to these policies. Our approach also fails to capture any health and economic costs associated with the mandates.

Our estimates are also assuredly lower bounds even for this narrow source of benefits. Properly identifying COVID-19 deaths is itself a difficult task that relies on adequate testing to determine what deaths are due to the pandemic and which result from unrelated illnesses. As COVID-19 is an underlying and not immediate cause of death, attribution requires medical professionals to correctly note that an individual had the coronavirus prior to death. With errors on 20-30% of death certificates prior to COVID-19, failure to count many at-home deaths without testing, COVID-19’s presence in the U.S. much earlier than previously measured, and the ability to detect it likely linked to the strength of a state’s outbreak, the official numbers used in our study may reflect an undercount of the pandemic’s actual death toll. Given these challenges, it may never be possible to know the true death count - but the magnitude of our estimates will continue to increase as more deaths are correctly identified.

Beyond averted deaths and other health benefits, stay-at-home mandates have led to a wide range of benefits, including improved air quality, reduced automobile insurance costs and traffic congestion, along with considerable costs associated with forgone non-COVID-19 healthcare leading to untreated and undiagnosed diseases and a mental health crisis with the potential for increases in suicide rates. As more data comes in and researchers are able to properly value all the costs and benefits of stay-at-home policies, then we will be able to know whether these policies have resulted in any overall losses or gains.

**Recent State Reopening Evidence:**

In the short-run, however, decisions to relax COVID-19 restrictions or reopen economies entirely should be motivated and guided by the health data. Looking at these data tells an initial cautionary tale.
COVID-19 Death Rates

Early Reopening States (AZ, FL, GA, TX, and WI)

All Other States and Washington D.C.

--- Death Rate  1 Week Moving Average
The above figure plots the daily COVID-19 death rates from two groups of states: those that opened more completely at an earlier time (Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Wisconsin), and all other states. While many of these other states have also relaxed restrictions since May 1, these five states represent a group that reopened more completely at an earlier time. The data show that the daily death rate reached its peak in both groups in mid-April. While the death rate began a linear decline in early May for all other states, it plateaued near its peak for states that reopened more completely. More advanced statistical analysis confirms that, for these five states, death rates in all days post-reopening are statistically indistinguishable from their peak death rates.

What the data show is that social distancing and stay at home policies have played a significant role in flattening the curve and in attenuating the magnitude of outbreaks across the country. What the most recent data show is that COVID-19 has not been eliminated - especially in areas that have chosen to reopen too soon.