Andrew McKim: One page summary

Primary Fields: Development Economics, Applied Econometrics, Microeconomics

TYPES OF JOBS I AM LOOKING FOR
Academic jobs: Both teaching and research universities. Special interest in liberal arts colleges.
Development jobs: Interested in USAID, FAO, Asian Development Bank, and similar institutions. Not as interested in NGOs.
Research jobs: If research priorities match (see below); Consulting jobs: Not interested

JOB MARKET PAPER
“Staff incentive policies for credit officers: an analysis of their effects within heterogeneous firms, contexts, and across tasks.”

- A quantitative study of the impacts of an increase in the power of staff incentive contracts (i.e. pay-for-performance contracts) within five microfinance institutions in Peru.
- Main conclusion: staff incentives can increase productivity, but not as much as was previously expected. This is primarily because of non-linearities in the contract.

Strengths of the paper:
- The paper is an important contribution to the empirical incentives literature.
  - This is first study to look at possible heterogeneity of impacts of staff incentives. All previous work shows an average effect of the incentive scheme on productivity (i.e. “20% average increase in productivity”). Our results show that some employees respond dramatically to the incentives, while others are not affected at all. These results are consistent with an expanded theoretical framework that incorporates non-linearities in incentive contracts and heterogeneous local market conditions (i.e. some credit officers work in “easy” areas while others work in “difficult” areas).
  - This is the first study to analyze the effect on multi-dimensional contracts/tasks (i.e. all others had only one measure of productivity; we have several). This allows us to examine possible substitution between tasks and finds some.

- Important policy implications: staff incentive policies are a critical area of interest for the more than 1500 microfinance institutions worldwide. As MFIs become less dependent on donor funds, they are looking to become more efficient, and many are adopting staff incentive policies.

How I am selling myself:
- I see myself as an applied development economist interested in very practical policy questions (i.e. Does this program work? Why or why not?).
- I have had experience working for development institutions prior to dissertation: important for teaching (real life stories and examples) and research (know how to approach institutions so they will want to participate in study)
- I can generate my own research funding and have contacts with several institutions in Latin America which facilitates access to program and household data.

Research interests:
  - Microfinance institutions: staff incentives, increasing competition and information sharing, rural vs. urban microfinance
  - Agricultural marketing: analysis of impacts of programs that aim to improve the efficiency of agricultural marketing channels

References: Alain de Janvry (alain@are.berkeley.edu), Betty Sadoulet (sadoulet@are.berkeley.edu), David Levine (levine@haas.berkeley.edu)