READINGS FOR THE SECOND HALF OF ARE251/ECON270A

ETHAN LIGON

This document may be updated as we go along. The most recent version can be found at http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/ARE251/fall2011.

FARM HOUSEHOLD MODELS

Pranab Bardhan and Christopher Udry. *Development Microeconomics*. Oxford University Press, 1999.

- Dwayne Benjamin. Household composition, labor markets, and labor demand: Testing for separation in agricultural household models. *Econometrica*, 60(2):287-322, 1992. ISSN 00129682. URL http: //www.jstor.org/stable/2951598.
- A. V. Chayanov. The Theory of the Peasant Economy. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1966.
- Angus Deaton. consumer expenditure. In Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, editors, *The New Palgrave Dictionary* of *Economics*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. URL http://www. dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000313.
- H.G. Jacoby. Shadow wages and peasant family labour supply: an econometric application to the peruvian sierra. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 60(4):903, 1993.
- Anjini Kochar. Smoothing consumption by smoothing income: Hoursof-work responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural India. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81(1):50–61, 1999.
- Russell L. Lamb. Inverse productivity: Land quality, labor markets, and measurement error. *Journal of Development Economics*, 71(1): 71–95, 2003.
- Kien T. Le. Separation hypothesis tests in the agriculture household model. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 92(5):1420– 1431, 2010.
- I. Singh, L. Squire, and J. Strauss. *Agricultural Household Models: Extensions, Applications and Policy.* John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986.

Date: October 25, 2011.

ETHAN LIGON

RISK SHARING

- John H. Cochrane. A simple test of consumption insurance. *Journal* of Political Economy, 99:957–976, 1991.
- Marcel Fafchamps. Solidarity networks in preindustrial societies: Rational peasants with a moral economy. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 41(1):147–174, 1992.
- Takashi Kurosaki. Consumption smoothing and the structure of risk and time preferences: Theory and evidence from village India. *Hi*totsubashi Journal of Economics, 42(2):103–117, 2001.
- Ethan Ligon. Targeting and informal insurance. In Stefan Dercon, editor, *Insurance Against Poverty*. Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Ethan Ligon. Risk sharing. In New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition, 2008.
- Barbara J. Mace. Full insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. *Journal of Political Economy*, 99:928–956, 1991.
- Jean-Phillip Platteau. Traditional systems of social security and hunger insurance: Past achievements and modern challenges. volume Social security in developing countries, chapter 4, pages 112–170. Clarendon Press, 1991.
- Michael Rothschild and Joseph E. Stiglitz. Increasing risk: I. A definition. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2:225–243, 1970.
- Robert M. Townsend. Microfoundations of macroeconomics. In Truman F. Bewley, editor, Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World Congress. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
- Robert M. Townsend. Risk and insurance in village India. *Econometrica*, 62(3):539–591, May 1994.

INTRA-HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION

- Becker, G. S. (1974). A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy 82, 1063–1094.
- Bobonis, G. (2009). Is the allocation of resources within the household efficient? new evidence from a randomized experiment. *Journal of Political Economy* 117(3), 453–503.
- Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, and P. A. Chiappori (2008). Efficient intra-household allocations and distribution factors: Implications and identification. *Review of Economic Studies Forthcoming*.
- Bourguignon, F. and P.-A. Chiappori (1992). Collective models of household behavior. *European Economic Review* 36, 355–364.
- Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. *Journal* of Political Economy 100(3), 437–67.

- Green, E. J. (1987). Lending and the smoothing of uninsurable income. In E. C. Prescott and N. Wallace (Eds.), *Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Harsanyi, J. C. and R. Selten (1972). A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information. *Management Science* 18, 80–106.
- Hayashi, F. (1996). Analysis of household saving: Past, present, and future. *The Japanese Economic Review* 47(1), 21–33.
- Ligon, E. (2002). Dynamic bargaining in households (with an application to Bangladesh). Giannini Foundation Working Paper.
- Ligon, E., J. P. Thomas, and T. Worrall (2000). Mutual insurance, individual savings, and limited commitment. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 3(2), 216–246.
- Lundberg, S. and R. A. Pollak (1994). Noncooperative bargaining models of marriage. American Economic Review 84(2), 132–137.
- Lundberg, S. and R. A. Pollak (1996). Bargaining and distribution in marriage. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(4), 139–158.
- Lundberg, S. J., R. A. Pollak, and T. J. Wales (1997). Do husbands and wives pool their resources? The Journal of Human Resources XXXII(3), 462–480.
- Marcet, A. and R. Marimon (1999). Recursive contracts. Manuscript.
- Mazzocco, M. (2007). Household inter-temporal behavior: A collective characterization and a test of commitment. *Review of Economic Studies* 74(3), 857–895.
- McElroy, M. (1990). The empirical content of Nash-bargained household behavior. *Journal of Human Resources* 25, 559–583.
- McElroy, M. B. and M. J. Horney (1981). Nash-bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. *International Economic Review* 22(2), 333–350.
- Moore, R. E. (1985). *Computational Functional Analysis*. Ellis Horwood Series in Mathematics and Its Applications. New York: Halsted Press.
- Nash, Jr., J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. *Econometrica* 18, 155–162.
- Roth, A. E. (1977, February). Individual rationality and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem. *Mathematics of Operations Re*search 2(1), 64–65.
- Spear, S. E. and S. Srivastava (1987). On repeated moral hazard with discounting. *Review of Economic Studies* 54, 599–618.
- Thomas, D. (1990). Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach. *Journal of Human Resources* 25, 635–64.