

1 **Cost-benefit Analysis of Rapid Microbial Detection for**
2 **Improving Marine Swim Advisories**

3
4
5 Sharyl J. M. Rabinovici^{a,b,1,2}, Justin E. Warren^{c,2},
6 Linwood H. Pendleton^d, and Alexandria B. Boehm^e
7

8
9 ^a Richard & Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy
10 2607 Hearst Avenue
11 University of California, Berkeley
12 Berkeley, CA 94720-7320
13

14 ^b Western Geographic Science Center
15 U.S. Geological Survey
16 345 Middlefield Road MS 531
17 Menlo Park, CA 94025
18

19 ^c Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources
20 Stanford University
21 Stanford, CA
22

23 ^d Department of Environmental Health
24 University of California at Los Angeles
25 Los Angeles, CA
26

27 ^e Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
28 Environmental Water Studies
29 Stanford University
30 Stanford, CA 94305-4020
31

32
33
34 A manuscript for the Policy Analysis section of
35 *Environmental Science & Technology*
36
37
38
39

¹ Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. TEL: (510) 665-4149; FAX: (510) 643-9657; EMAIL: srabinovici@berkeley.edu.

² These authors contributed equally to this work.

1 **ABSTRACT**

2 Using a transfer policy analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of real-time detection of fecal
3 indicator bacteria (FIB) at reducing gastrointestinal illness and improving the net benefit of
4 marine beach advisories over the *status quo*. We compare hypothetical advisory scenarios that
5 assume a different water quality monitoring technology (none, culture-based assay, or rapid
6 detection). Illness estimates are made using two epidemiological models that relate enterococci
7 densities to gastrointestinal illness (GI). The health costs associated with GI are compared to the
8 recreational value of swimming to determine net economic benefit. We find that rapid detection
9 results in significantly fewer swimming-related GI with only one of the two epidemiological
10 models. Beachgoer compliance with advisories is important in determining net benefit, but
11 monitoring costs are not. Notably, non-compliance with advisories has the highest expected net
12 benefit regardless of the speed of reporting. This finding is somewhat sensitive to the values
13 chosen for V_{health} and V_{rec} under one epidemiologic model but not the other. In general, beaches
14 are more likely to benefit from implementation of rapid detection technologies for monitoring
15 when over 4% or 15% of the water quality measurements result in a change in advisory status,
16 depending on the epidemiology model used.

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 Federal and state laws establish criteria based on fecal indicator bacteria (hereafter referred to as
3 FIB) including total coliform (TC), fecal coliform (FC), and enterococci (ENT) to determine
4 when water quality conditions at recreational marine beaches are unfit for human contact (1,2).
5 The practice of using FIB to distinguish periods of unacceptably high risk is based on
6 epidemiology studies (3-5) that show correlations between human health symptoms (including
7 stomach pain, diarrhea, and respiratory ailments) and FIB concentrations in marine water known
8 to receive human fecal waste.

9
10 According to state and federal FIB criteria, bacterial pollution is widespread at United States
11 (US) coastal, river and lake beaches. In 2005, there were over 20,000 beach closures and
12 advisories, compared to just 6,200 in 1999 (6), a consequence of more stringent water quality
13 criteria and an increase in the number of beaches monitored. Several studies have questioned the
14 efficacy of current methods of issuing closures and advisories because testing methods for the
15 quantification of FIB are culture-based, requiring more than 1-day (herein referred to as 1-d) of
16 incubation. The 1-d time lag between sample collection and data availability for coastal
17 managers can result in mis-notification of the beach-going public (7,8). Beaches failing the
18 health criteria may be placed under advisory 1-d late while beaches returning to acceptable
19 standards can remain posted erroneously.

20
21 To overcome this problem, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and others
22 (9,10) are developing rapid detection methods for FIB. Exploration of expedited FIB detection
23 technologies is mandated by the US Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act

1 of 2000 (11). Quantitative polymerase chain reaction (QPCR), transcription mediated
2 amplification, and dual-wavelength fluorimetry are promising rapid detection technologies that
3 take as little as three hours to produce bacterial counts (9,10,12). QPCR measurements of ENT
4 correlate with swimmer gastrointestinal illness (GI) in the Great Lakes (13), indicating the tool
5 has potential for use in protecting human health. If beach managers were to switch from culture-
6 based techniques to a rapid detection technology, then unintended management errors resulting
7 from the 1-d lag would be eliminated. Rapid detection would also help in determining when to
8 lift a closure or advisory triggered by a storm or sewage spill. One issue that would not be
9 addressed by rapid detection, however, is the variability of FIB densities observed at time scales
10 less than a day (14).

11
12 In the present study, we determine the extent to which using a rapid-detection technology in day-
13 to-day beach management would reduce incidence of recreational waterborne illness and
14 increase net benefits among swimmers compared to the *status quo*. This is accomplished using a
15 transfer policy analysis (15) that retrospectively examines hypothetical monitoring scenarios at a
16 popular beach in southern California (CA). We extend the approaches taken in Rabinovici et al.
17 (8) and Hou et al. (16) by introducing a mechanism for testing how sensitive the policy analysis
18 outcome is to the level of compliance potential swimmers exhibit toward advisories. We
19 compare three scenarios: (1) the beach is placed under a swimming advisory 1-d after CA water
20 quality criteria are exceeded (as currently occurs owing to the 1-d required for culturing FIB), (2)
21 the beach is placed under advisory on the same day CA water quality criteria are exceeded (as
22 would occur if a rapid detection method were used to determine FIB densities), and (3) the beach
23 is never placed under advisory. Illness estimates under each scenario are obtained using two

1 available epidemiological models for the relationship between ENT and excess gastrointestinal
2 illness (GI). The health costs associated with excess GI (17) are compared to the recreational
3 value of a southern CA beach visit involving swimming (18-20) to determine the net benefit of
4 rapid detection to potential swimmers.

5
6 The results are used to address the following five questions: (1) Which monitoring technology
7 scenario results in the lowest predicted incidence of GI? (2) Does rapid detection reduce illness
8 rates significantly more than 1-d lagged advisories, compared to never placing the beach under
9 advisory? (3) Which policy scenario results in the highest net benefit in aggregate for swimmers?
10 (4) Does rapid detection result in significantly higher net benefit for swimmers than 1-d lagged
11 advisories? (5) What are the key sensitivities and uncertainties involved in answering the above
12 questions?

13

14 **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

15 **Water Quality Data.** Our analysis focuses on Huntington State Beach (HSB) in Orange County,
16 CA (Figure 1). HSB was selected for analysis because of its rich water quality and attendance
17 records and importance as one of the most visited beaches in the nation (approximately 1.9
18 million visits were made to HSB in 2000 (21)). We use publicly available TC, FC, and ENT data
19 sampled at four monitoring stations within HSB during the summer of 2000 (defined as the 99
20 days between Memorial Day – 29 May and Labor Day – 4 September) (22). When an FIB
21 density is reported as under or over the method’s detection limit, we assumed the FIB density
22 was equal to the detection limit (14). Further details regarding the FIB data are found in
23 Supporting Information (SI).

1

2 In CA, violation of any one of seven water quality criteria (given in SI) requires a beach be
3 placed under a swimming advisory (also referred to as “posted”). An advisory is distinct from a
4 closure in that it is not enforced—swimmers are allowed to decide whether or not to enter the
5 water. Advisories are intended to provide a binary signal to potential swimmers about whether
6 FIB levels are above or below state standards at a particular site. Note that if all visitors decide
7 not to swim once they see an advisory is in place, an advisory could be behaviorally equivalent
8 to a closure.

9

10 We use FIB data at each of the four monitoring stations to determine the management decision
11 (posted or not posted) for each policy scenario for the region of beach closest in proximity to that
12 monitoring station (Figure 1). In light of studies showing that temporal variation between ENT
13 on consecutive days exhibits complex behavior (23), we choose to examine policy outcomes
14 only for the 71 out of 99 days in the summer 2000 season when water quality was actually
15 measured at HSB rather than attempt to estimate ENT on days when water quality is not
16 available.

17

18 **Visitor Data and Behavioral Assumptions.** Daily attendance data for HSB in the summer of
19 2000 are derived from lifeguard records as reported by Morton and Pendleton (24). In a recent
20 study by Wade et al. (13), 18.4% and 42.1% of beach-goers reported immersing their heads
21 during visits to Lake Erie and Lake Michigan beaches, respectively, in 2003. Similarly,
22 Hanemann et al. found that in the summer of 2000, 43.6% of beach goers in Los Angeles and

1 Orange Counties had substantial contact with the ocean water (18). Based on these estimates, we
2 assume 43% of beach visitors intend to go swimming on any given day.

3
4 We define the number of visitors to the beach multiplied by the percentage of visitors who intend
5 to swim as the maximum number of “potential swimmers” that are impacted by an advisory.
6 Potential swimmers are the individuals who would swim at the beach if there were no advisory.
7 We assume that potential swimmers at HSB distribute themselves evenly along the beach and are
8 exposed to the ENT density and management decision associated with the closest monitoring
9 station. S_k represents the number of potential swimmers within the region closest to station k on a
10 given day (Figure 1). We use the term “swimmers” to specify the number of potential swimmers
11 who actually swim, conditional on advisory status. For days when no advisory is in effect, all
12 potential swimmers are swimmers. When an advisory is issued, the two populations can diverge
13 depending on how many potential swimmers choose to comply with the advisory.

14
15 To our knowledge, the behavioral response of potential swimmers to beach advisories has not
16 been investigated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some potential swimmers ignore advisories
17 and swim despite being informed by a sign on-site about heightened health risks. We introduce a
18 hypothetical compliance variable c to explore how changes in compliance would affect illness
19 incidence and net benefits in the management scenarios. Hereafter, c ($0 \leq c \leq 1$) denotes the
20 fraction of potential swimmers that comply with a beach advisory. If $c = 1$ there is complete
21 compliance with the advisory (all potential swimmers refrain from entering the water). If $c = 0$,
22 all potential swimmers disregard the advisory.

23

1 **Advisory Scenarios.** We consider the following three hypothetical policy scenarios:

2 1. Standard Practice Scenario (SP): Advisories are instituted following receipt of a water
3 sample result that exceeds any one of seven CA standards, with results available 1-d after
4 sampling.

5 2. Rapid Detection Scenario (RD): Advisories are instituted following receipt of a water
6 sample result that exceeds any one of seven CA standards, except sampling results are
7 available for use by mid-morning of the same day.

8 3. No Intervention Scenario (NI): No advisories are issued.

9

10 The advisory status of each region of beach k , P_k , is set to 1 if an advisory is posted and 0 if not.

11 Advisories at a monitoring station are assumed to affect only the region of beach closest to that
12 monitoring station (Figure 1). In SP and RD, advisories remain in effect until a subsequent
13 sample result returns the beach to compliance with all standards.

14

15 **Incidence of Gastrointestinal Illness.** Recreational exposure to waters with elevated FIB can
16 cause many types and severities of illness. In the present study, we limit our assessment to GI
17 because it is the most frequent health endpoint associated with exposure to impaired recreational
18 waters (4,5), though the definition of GI varies between epidemiology studies.

19

20 Currently, two distinct epidemiology models inform FIB standards internationally and in the
21 United States (US). Kay et al. (25), cited in World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines (26),
22 studied multiple health outcomes in a randomized, case-controlled group of 548 volunteer
23 subjects exposed to marine waters in four separate United Kingdom sites in the 1990s. In the US,

1 federal and state criteria are informed by cohort studies done at four US sites in the 1970s by
2 Cabelli et al. (27). The Cabelli et al. model is similar to a model obtained in a meta-analysis of
3 27 epidemiology studies that includes a mix of cohort (including the sites examined by Cabelli et
4 al.), event, and randomized trial designs that related water exposure to GI (5).

5
6 In the present study, we compare predicted excess GI using the epidemiology equations for the
7 relationship between ENT density and GI reported by Kay et al. (25) and Cabelli et al. (27). We
8 use both because there is ongoing debate in the literature about the appropriate derivation and
9 use of these models (5, 28-31).

10

11 We adopt the following equation from Cabelli et al. (27) to describe excess risk for a GI episode
12 involving vomiting, diarrhea, stomach ache or nausea as:

$$13 \quad R_k = [24.2 \log(ENT_k) - 5.1] / 1000 \quad (1)$$

14 where R_k is the excess risk of GI for individuals exposed to ENT at region k , and ENT_k is the
15 ENT concentration in colony forming units (CFU) per 100 mL to which individuals are exposed
16 when they immerse in the water at region k . Excess risk is measured relative to non-swimmers.

17 We use Cabelli et al.'s (27) GI health endpoint, rather than highly credible GI, because it is a
18 suitable match to the health outcomes described by Kay et al. (25). Hereafter, the relationship
19 between excess risk and ENT described in equation 1 is referred to as model C.

20

21 We use the following equation based on Kay et al. (25):

$$22 \quad R_k = \frac{e^z}{1 + e^z} - b \quad (2a)$$

23 where

1 $z = 0.20102\sqrt{ENT_k - 32} - 2.3561$ (2b)

2 b is the background incidence of GI, and ENT_k as previously defined. The dependent variable in
3 the original form of model K is fecal streptococci (FS), not ENT. According to the WHO, FS and
4 ENT represent the same bacterial groups, so our substitution of ENT for FS in equation (2b) is
5 justified (26). The health end-points for this epidemiology model are vomiting, diarrhea, nausea
6 with fever, or indigestion with fever. We set $b= 0.0975$, the background risk observed in the Kay
7 et al. study for non-swimmers. Non-zero estimates of R_k are obtained only for ENT_k greater than
8 32 CFU/100 mL. Because Kay et al. did not observe ENT levels above 158 CFU/100mL, we
9 assume $R_k= 0.378$ for all ENT densities above 158 CFU/100mL. Equations 2a and 2b are
10 hereafter referred to as model K.

11
12 The excess risk predicted as a function of ENT density varies substantially between these two
13 models (Figure 2). The discrepancy can be attributed to contrasting study designs and the fact
14 that the studies were conducted at different locations. Together with results from a recent study
15 that found no statistical association between FIB exposures and 14 different human health
16 outcomes in marine water predominantly affected by non-point sources (32), these discrepancies
17 suggest that the relationship between health outcomes and water quality is a major source of
18 uncertainty for any beach water quality policy analysis. In any case, the analysis presented here
19 includes the best estimates for GI based on currently available information. Limitations and
20 justifications for using these two models to estimate excess GI risk at HSB are described by
21 Given et al. (21).

22

23 Daily GI predicted to occur at HSB is:

1
$$G = \sum_k S_k R_k(c | P_k) \tag{3}$$

2 where all variables have been defined previously. When there is no advisory in place ($P_k = 0$), c
3 = 1 (one). When there is an advisory ($P_k = 1$), we allow c to vary between 0 (zero) and 1 (one) to
4 reflect the level of compliance. For ease of display, we report an average per day estimate of
5 illnesses for each scenario by dividing the total number of predicted illnesses for that policy
6 scenario by 71, the number of days included in our analysis.

7
8 **Transfer Policy Analysis and Net Economic Impacts.** We use transfer policy analysis as the
9 general framework for integrating the existing epidemiologic models and health and recreation
10 welfare estimates and applying them to the water quality and visitor population at the case study
11 site (15,33). Two key factors in the reliability of transfer policy analysis are the quality of the
12 methods and data used in the original studies and the degree of similarity between the original
13 and transfer contexts (34). In the present study, we transfer mean point estimate economic values
14 from contemporary local studies and adjust those values using the Consumer Price Index to year
15 2000 dollars. We focus on the population of potential swimmers and do not address economic
16 benefits or costs to local businesses or agencies from concessions, parking fees, and so on. The
17 economic values that we consider are the benefits of outdoor swimming recreation (which
18 accrues whenever a beachgoer who intended to swim actually does so) and the health costs
19 incurred (when an illness results from that swim exposure). This is reasonable because advisories
20 do nothing to change water quality and can only address exposure risk.

21
22 The expected per day net economic impact to potential swimmers at HSB is calculated as:

$$1 \quad NB = \sum_k S_k (c | P_k) [V_{rec} - R_k V_{health}] - M \quad (4)$$

2 where V_{rec} is the average value of outdoor swim recreation per visitor per day, V_{health} is the
 3 average economic cost of illness (COI) per GI, and M is the scenario-specific cost of monitoring.
 4 We estimate a typical per day cost for collecting monitoring data at \$120 for culture-based
 5 assays for the SP scenario and \$370 for the RD scenario's tests (based on professional judgment,
 6 discussed in more detail in SI). The NI scenario is cost-free.

7
 8 Expected net benefit is an accepted method for assessing trade-offs in aggregate by weighting
 9 outcomes by their probabilities of occurrence and the number of people affected. For any given
 10 day, the average individual's net benefit for swimming is given by: $V_{rec} - R_k V_{health}$. Equation 4
 11 thus expresses the trade-off (unique to each day at each station) between the value of recreation
 12 and the excess risk posed by the ENT densities weighted by the value per health event and
 13 multiplied by the number of swimmers exposed on that day. This formulation implies that
 14 potential swimmers who choose not to swim based on an advisory experience no benefits or
 15 costs. In other words, we consider only changes to the individual's baseline utility that are
 16 attributable to their beach-going activity. Compliance with advisories is equivalent to "staying
 17 home". We assume that society prefers the policy that delivers the highest possible positive net
 18 benefit. Results are presented as per day averages for each scenario to simplify comparison and
 19 presentation.

20
 21 For this study, we set $V_{rec} = \$16.15$, a value specific to southern California beaches (19, 20). We
 22 set $V_{health} = \$35.57$ based on a study by Dwight et al. (17) that estimated lost income (wage) and

1 direct medical costs of a GI episode of the type described in the Kay et al. paper (25) to an
2 average adult in Orange County, CA. Additional discussion of the merits and limitations
3 involved in benefit (economic value) transfer is presented in SI.

4
5 **Statistical Confidence.** We use a Wilcoxon signed rank test to compare daily excess GI
6 predicted under each policy scenario. This test is applied to all possible pairings of the three
7 scenarios at values of c from 0 (zero) to 1 (one) at 0.05 increments. The different outcomes are
8 compared for each day, and the magnitude and direction of these differences are tested to
9 determine if there are consistent relationships between the scenarios. The illness distributions
10 predicted by the epidemiological models meet the assumption of symmetry required by the
11 Wilcoxon signed rank test. The distributions of net benefit do not, so we test the significance of
12 the net benefit differences between scenarios with the less restrictive sign test. The above tests
13 are computed using non-parametric routines in SPSS 11.

14

15 **RESULTS**

16 **Water Quality and Attendance.** During the study period, HSB experienced a total of 30 ENT,
17 18 FC, and 13 TC single-sample standard (SSS) exceedances as well as 55 ENT geometric mean
18 standard (GMS) exceedances. Consecutive SSS exceedances occurred 11 times for ENT, 5 times
19 for FC, and 4 times for TC. In addition, 48 consecutive-day exceedances of the ENT GMS were
20 observed (Table 1). The number of consecutive exceedances relative to single day exceedances is
21 important because for advisories lasting two or more days, RD will only yield different results
22 from SP on the first day of the exceedance sequence and the day following the sequence.

23

1 Attendance data from the summer of 2000 shows a median daily visitor count of 9,800 and an
2 inter-quartile range of 11,800 visitors. These numbers are typical for HSB (data not shown).

3
4 **Estimated Illness Incidence.** Using model C, RD with full compliance results in an average of
5 77 GI d⁻¹, 48 fewer than under NI (Figure 3). Therefore, in the best case of full compliance, real
6 time water quality information eliminates 38% of the illnesses that would have occurred if there
7 were no advisories issued. The SP scenario with full compliance leads to 79 GI d⁻¹, a reduction
8 of 37% compared to the NI scenario. RD provides no significant improvement in illness
9 reduction over SP ($p>0.05$). This is attributable to the low level of excess risk predicted by model
10 C across the inter-quartile range of observed ENT concentrations (6 – 44 CFU/100mL). If model
11 C is the most appropriate epidemiologic model for this site, management based on RD does not
12 produce any appreciable improvement in illness incidence compared to SP.

13
14 In contrast, when model K is used in the policy analysis, the differences between RD and SP are
15 statistically distinguishable at all values of c above 0 (zero) ($p<0.05$) (Figure 3). RD with full
16 compliance results in an average of 65 GI d⁻¹, a 83% reduction in the number of GI that would
17 have occurred if there were no advisories at all (NI). The SP scenario with full compliance leads
18 to 144 GI d⁻¹, a reduction of 63% compared to the NI scenario. RD results in significantly fewer
19 ($p<0.05$) illnesses relative to both the SP and NI scenarios.

20
21 Under both the C and K models, the differences between NI and each of the two intervention
22 scenarios are statistically significant ($p<0.05$) whenever $c > 0$ (zero). Therefore, either
23 monitoring strategy significantly reduces illness relative to never issuing advisories. The

1 magnitude of the reduction depends critically on the proportion of potential swimmers that
2 comply with posted advisories. Compliance with posted warnings affects illness outcomes for
3 more under model K than model C (Figure 3). Note that even full compliance with advisories
4 cannot eliminate all GI because concentrations of ENT under the CA water quality standards are
5 still associated with excess illness (Figure 2). As many as 4% (model C) or 24% (model K) of
6 swimmers may experience GI as a result of water conditions in compliance with the CA ENT
7 SSS.

8

9 **Expected Net Benefits.** The NI scenario creates a higher expected net benefit than either of the
10 two monitoring scenarios (net benefits for NI are $\$74,870d^{-1}$ and $\$65,397d^{-1}$ using models C and
11 K, respectively). Net benefits are highest for both RD and SP when compliance is lowest—in
12 other words, when visitors “choose” to make these two scenarios as similar as possible to NI by
13 ignoring the advisories (Figure 4). Thus, non-compliance with advisories has the highest
14 expected net benefit regardless of the speed of reporting.

15

16 At $c = 0$, the net benefits of SP and RD differ from NI only because of the costs associated with
17 monitoring. For RD at $c = 0$, net benefits are $\$74,378 d^{-1}$ using model C and $\$64,905 d^{-1}$ using
18 model K. For SP at $c = 0$, net benefits are $\$74,710 d^{-1}$ using model C and $\$65,237 d^{-1}$ using
19 model K. Net benefits are consistently lower when model K is used because it predicts
20 significantly ($p < 0.05$) more GI than does model C for the same ENT density (Figure 2).

21

22 When model C is used, the net benefit provided by RD exceeds that of SP whenever compliance
23 is above 0.17. However, the null hypothesis that the RD and SP scenarios provide the same net

1 benefits cannot be rejected at any level of c ($p>0.05$). This is largely because there is little
2 difference in GI between the two scenarios under model C (Figure 3).

3
4 The policy analysis using model K gives contrasting results. There is a significant difference
5 ($p<0.05$) between the net benefits provided by all three scenarios. Above c of 0.07, the net
6 benefit provided by RD exceeds that of SP. In other words, 93% of swimmers would have to be
7 ignoring advisories for SP scenario net benefits to be less than those predicted in the RD
8 scenario. At that extreme, the SP scenario provides higher net benefit only because of its lower
9 testing costs. With full compliance ($c = 1$), RD provides \$4,309 more net benefit per day than
10 SP.

11
12 **DISCUSSION**
13 **RD does not necessarily reduce illness rates significantly relative to SP.** Using water quality
14 and visitor data from HSB in the summer of 2000 and the best available epidemiologic models,
15 we find that both RD and SP reduce the number of GI predicted to occur compared to having no
16 advisories. However, RD provides a statistically significant benefit over SP only if excess risk
17 for GI at HSB is best-described with model K. While model K is used in standard-setting
18 internationally, it is an “outlier” that predicts more illnesses for the same range of ENT than the
19 majority of other studies (4,5). Thus, it might be viewed by some experts as providing an over-
20 estimate of GI at HSB. Indeed, both models C and K may over-estimate illness rates if the
21 finding that traditional FIB in waters near San Diego, CA predominantly affected by non-point
22 pollution were not associated with health risks to swimmers (34) is replicated elsewhere. That
23 would call into question the assumption that models of GI-FIB relationships are transferable

1 between locations and their suitability for standard-setting. If FIB do not indicate an increased
2 health risk at a particular site, testing for FIB more rapidly there will do little improve to public
3 health.

4

5 **Issuing no advisories—a practice not permitted under current law—results in the highest**
6 **net benefit for potential swimmers.** Our analysis assumes that a major purpose of beach
7 advisories is to reduce the incidence of GI in swimmers while providing a reasonable level of
8 recreational access. Expected net benefit is the best available mechanism for expressing the
9 trade-offs between these two disparate objectives. We find that RD does not necessarily result in
10 significantly higher net benefit than SP for the average swimmer. Also, regardless of the
11 epidemiologic model used or whether beachgoers comply with advisories, both RD and SP
12 reduce net benefits compared to NI. Thus, according to our analysis, advisories based on CA
13 water quality criteria decrease the net benefit compared to issuing no advisories.

14

15 This somewhat surprising result is consistent with previous findings (8,16) that when the best
16 available epidemiologic and economic assumptions are used, the benefits to the large number of
17 swimmers outweighs the economic impacts associated with the few who suffer the excess GI.
18 Our finding does not imply that there would be no value to reducing bacterial contamination,
19 because total net benefit could still be improved by reducing ENT densities to reduce excess risk.
20 Under the NI scenario, the estimated number and total cost of GI, respectively, for the 71 day
21 period at HSB were 8,860 and \$315,153 under model C and 27,769 and \$987,737 under model
22 K.

23

1 Our formula for expected net benefit does not address the degree to which advisories increase
2 safety awareness, precaution, or indirectly educate beach goers about issues of coastal water
3 quality. Nor do we address the benefits that arise from either regular FIB monitoring to establish
4 a baseline understanding of local water quality or intensive sampling efforts designed to track
5 pollutant sources so they can be remediated. However, these benefits are unlikely to be different
6 whether FIB detection is rapid or 1-d delayed.

7
8 **We reach different conclusions with regard to the potential benefits of using RD depending**
9 **on the epidemiologic model used.** Under model K, both illness counts and net benefit outcomes
10 between RD and SP were significantly different, but neither was under model C. This suggests
11 that in beach policy analyses, careful attention is required in choosing a epidemiologic model
12 that accords with the specific conditions of the beach(es) under consideration. New
13 epidemiology studies that focus on understanding health outcomes resulting from exposure to
14 coastal waters receiving different types and sources of contamination or visited by different
15 bather populations (e.g., surfers versus swimmers or tourists versus regular local beach users)
16 will improve future benefit transfer policy analyses. It is possible that including the economic
17 costs associated with other types of recreational water-borne illnesses, such as significant
18 respiratory disease, or including health effects experienced by more susceptible swimmers (for
19 example, children, elderly, and immuno-compromised) would alter our findings.

20
21 **The policy preference ranking is only sensitive to the values chosen for V_{health} and V_{rec} when**
22 **model K is used.** We assign \$35.57 to V_{health} , which is in the middle range of reported values for
23 mild to moderate multi-day health impairments in a recent meta-analysis of seven morbidity

1 valuation studies (35). Pain and suffering and the value of lost leisure time are not addressed,
2 which could make the Dwight et al. value we use an under-estimate. We conduct a “break-even
3 analysis” to show how high the V_{health} parameter would need to be (holding all else constant) for
4 SP and RD to exhibit higher net benefits than NI. Using model C with full compliance, COI
5 would have to be 1270% higher (\$489) to make the SP scenario more net beneficial than the NI
6 scenario and about 1110% higher (\$430) for the RD scenario. Thus, the delivery of higher
7 expected net benefit under NI compared to RD and SP appears unchanged over a range of
8 reasonable values for the COI parameter under model C. Using model K with full compliance,
9 COI would have to be about 150% higher (\$90) than the Dwight et al. estimate for SP to be more
10 net beneficial than NI, and about 80% higher (\$63) for RD to rank more beneficial than NI. Thus
11 if model K is the most appropriate epidemiology model for HSB and COI is twice the value
12 estimated by Dwight et al., then the two monitoring scenarios could have higher net benefits than
13 NI.

14
15 Conceptually, V_{rec} varies across individuals and user populations, thus it is useful to consider a
16 reasonable range of values (36). Holding all else constant and using model C with full
17 compliance, V_{rec} would have to be less than \$1 for the SP and RD scenario to have higher net
18 benefits than the NI scenario, a value which is implausibly low (see SI for a discussion). Using
19 model K with full compliance, V_{rec} would have to be less than half the \$16.15 value we used
20 (\$6.30 and \$8.90, respectively) for SP and RD to rank more beneficial than NI. If model K is
21 appropriate for this beach and V_{rec} is less than about 50% of the estimate we use, which is
22 unlikely given our understanding of recreational valuations, then the RD and SP scenarios could
23 produce higher net benefit than NI.

1
2 **Swimmer behavior is a critical factor that deserves more study.** We find that compliance
3 behavior of potential swimmers has an important impact on both number of predicted illnesses
4 and the potential net economic benefit of rapid detection technologies. Compliance does not,
5 however, impact the policy preference ranking. Across nearly all possible values of c using
6 models K and C to estimate GI, RD provides greater illness reduction and greater net benefits
7 than SP. The only exception is at very low levels of compliance ($c < 0.07$ or $c < 0.17$, depending
8 on epidemiology model) where the greater cost of RD monitoring causes the cheaper standard
9 monitoring practice to win out. A survey of beachgoer behavior collected during summer 2005 at
10 HSB indicates a reported 51% compliance rate both local and at other southern CA beaches (data
11 not shown), suggesting that such low compliance is unlikely.

12
13 Our analysis does not address the potential for endogeneity between advisory status and
14 beachgoer attendance and compliance with advisories. Chapman and Hanemann (20) provide
15 evidence that availability of regional substitutes is important to both attendance level and
16 recreational value lost. Further research is needed to identify how the number of potential bathers
17 per day changes in response to advisory on prior day(s) or at nearby locations.

18
19 **Analysis of a hypothetical beach water quality data set indicates that advisory “volatility”**
20 **is key to determining of the benefit RD can provide relative to SP.** We conducted the same
21 benefits transfer analysis using 500,000 simulated ENT data series constructed by randomly
22 sampling cumulative density functions of 10,000 different beta distributions. The goal was to
23 determine the characteristics of beach water quality distribution that are important in determining

1 if RD can improve net benefits to society relative to *status quo* (SP) (see SI for details). Our
2 analysis indicates that “advisory volatility” is a key attribute of a beach water quality data that
3 determines the outcome of the analysis. We define advisory volatility as the percent of
4 monitoring days that result in a change in advisory status and can range from 0 to 100%. When
5 volatility is low (advisory status changes relatively infrequently), RD does not provide improved
6 benefits to society over SP under the assumptions used in this paper. As volatility increases
7 above 4% and 15% for models K and C, respectively, then RD provides improved benefits over
8 SP. The difference in the volatility threshold for analyses performed with the two epidemiology
9 models arises because model C suggests a weaker relationship between ENT and excess risk than
10 model K.

11
12 **Our analysis suggests that beach managers should be cautious in moving to rapid detection**
13 **of FIB for routine water quality monitoring.** Beach-specific circumstances, including visitor
14 levels, swimmer populations and their behavioral responses to advisories (especially substitution
15 behavior from one beach to another which we did not consider), and day to day FIB density
16 patterns can all limit how much reduction in exposure beach advisories based on rapid detection
17 would be able to achieve.

1 **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

2 The authors acknowledge Michael Hanemann, Jack Colford, and Deyi Hou for their input on the
3 project. ABB and SJMR are supported by NOAA Oceans and Human Health Grant
4 NA04OAR4600195 to ABB. SJMR conducted a substantial portion of this research while
5 employed by the USGS.

1 **LITERATURE CITED**

2

3 (1) California State Department of Health Services. Statutes of 1997. Health and Safety Code
4 §115880. Assembly Bill 411, Chapter 765.

5 (2) U. S. EPA, Water Quality Standards for Coastal and Great Lakes Recreation Waters,
6 Federal Register 69(220), November 16, 2004, 67217-43.

7 (3) Haile, R. W.; Witte, J. S.; Gold, M.; Cressey, R.; McGee, C.; Millikan, R. C.; Glasser, A.;
8 Harawa, N.; Ervin, C.; Harmon, P.; Harper, J.; Dermand, J.; Alamillo, J.; Barrett, K.;
9 Nides, M.; Wang, G. Y. The health effects of swimming in ocean water contaminated by
10 storm drain runoff. *Epidemiol.* **1999**, *10*, 355-363.

11 (4) Prüss, A. Review of epidemiological studies on health effects from exposure to recreational
12 water. *Int. J. Epidemiol.* **1998**, *27*, 1-9.

13 (5) Wade, T. J.; Pai, N.; Eisenberg, J. S.; Colford, J. M. Do U. S. Environmental Protection
14 Agency water quality guidelines for recreational waters prevent gastrointestinal illness? A
15 systematic review and meta-analysis. *Environ. Health Perspect.* **2003**, *111*, 1102-1109.

16 (6) Natural Resources Defense Council. *Testing the Waters 2006: A Guide to Water Quality at*
17 *Vacation Beaches*; NRDC: New York, 2006.

18 <http://www.nrdc.org/water/oceans/ttw/titinx.asp>

19 (7) Kim, J.; Grant, S. Public mis-notification of coastal water quality: a probabilistic
20 evaluation of posting errors at Huntington Beach, CA. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2004**, *38*,
21 2497-2504.

- 1 (8) Rabinovici, S.; Bernknopf, R. L.; Wein, A. M.; Coursey, D. L.; Whitman, R. L. Economic
2 and health risk trade-offs of swim closures at a Lake Michigan beach. *Environ. Sci.*
3 *Technol.* **2004**, *38*, 2737-45.
- 4 (9) Griffith, J.F.; Weisberg, S.B. *Evaluation of rapid microbiology methods for measuring*
5 *recreational water quality*, Tech. Rep. 485, Southern California Coastal Water Research
6 Project, Westminster, CA, 2006. <http://www.sccwrp.org/pubs/techrpt.htm>
- 7 (10) Haugland, R.A.; Siefiring, S.C.; Wymer, L.J.; Brenner, K.P.; Dufour, A.P. Comparison of
8 *Enterococcus* density measurements by quantitative polymerase chain reaction and
9 membrane filter culture analysis at two freshwater recreational beaches. *Water Res.* 2005,
10 *39*, 559-568.
- 11 (11) The Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health Act of 2000, Public Law 106–
12 284 Amendment to 33 USC 1251, October 10, 2000.
- 13 (12) National Research Council, *Indicators for Waterborne Pathogens*; ed. M. Osborn; The
14 National Academies Press: Washington, D.C., 2000.
- 15 (13) Wade, T.J.; Calderon, R.J.; Sams, E.; Beach, M.; Brenner, K. P.; Williams, A.H.; Dufour,
16 A. P. Rapidly measured indicators of recreational water quality are predictive of swimming-
17 associated gastrointestinal illness, *Environ. Health Perspect.* **2006**, *114*, 24-28.
- 18 (14) Boehm, A. B.; Grant, S. B.; Kim, J. H.; Mowbray, S. L.; McGee, C. D.; Clark, C. D.; Foley,
19 D. M.; Wellman, D. E. Decadal and shorter period variability of surf zone water quality at
20 Huntington Beach, California. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2002**, *36*, 3885-3892.
- 21 (15) Desvousges, W. H.; Johnson, F. R.; Banzhaf, H. S. *Environmental Policy Analysis with*
22 *Limited Information: Principles and Applications of the Transfer Method*; Edward Edgar:
23 Northhampton, MA, 1998.

- 1 (16) Hou, D.; Rabinovici, S.J.; Boehm, A. B. Enterococci predictions from partial least squares
2 regression models in conjunction with a single-sample standard improve the efficacy of
3 beach management advisories, *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2006**, *40*, 1737-1743.
- 4 (17) Dwight, R. H.; Fernandez, L. M.; Baker, D. B.; Semenza, J. C.; Olson, B. H. Estimating the
5 economic burden from illnesses associated with recreational coastal water pollution -- a
6 case study in Orange County, CA. *J. Environ. Manage.* **2005**, *76*, 95-103.
- 7 (18) Hanemann, W. M.; Pendleton, L.; Mohn, C.; Hilger, J.; Kurisawa, K.; Layton, D.; Vasquez,
8 F. *Using Revealed Preference Models to Estimate the Affect of Coastal Water Quality on*
9 *Beach Choice in Southern California*; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
10 The California State Water Resources Control Board, California Department of Fish and
11 Game: Sacramento, CA, 2004.
- 12 (19) Hanemann, W. M. Final conclusions of Professor Michael Hanemann regarding lost
13 recreational damages resulting from the *American Trader* Oil Spill. Report submitted to the
14 State of California Attorney General's Office. August 15, 1997.
- 15 (20) Chapman, D.; Hanemann, W. M. Environmental damages in the court: the American Trader
16 case, in *The Law and Economics of the Environment*, ed. A. Heyes, 2001, 319-367.
- 17 (21) Given, S.; Pendleton, L.; Boehm, A. B. Regional public health cost estimates contaminated
18 coastal waters: a case study of gastroenteritis at southern California beaches. *Environ. Sci.*
19 *Technol.* **2006**, *40*, 4851-4858.
- 20 (22) Orange County Sanitation District, http://www.ocsd.com/about/reports/lab_archive.asp
- 21 (23) Boehm, A. B.; Weisberg, S. B. Tidal forcing of enterococci at marine recreational beaches
22 at fortnightly and semidiurnal frequencies. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2005**, *39*; 5575-5583.

- 1 (24) Morton, J.; Pendleton, L. *A Database of Beach Closures and Historical Water Quality*.
2 Prepared for the California State Water Resources Control Board: Sacramento, CA, 2001.
- 3 (25) Kay, D.; Fleisher, J. M.; Salmon, R. L.; Wyer, M. D.; Godfree, A. F.; Zelenauch-Jacquotte,
4 Z.; Shore, R. Predicting likelihood of gastroenteritis from sea bathing: results from
5 randomized exposure, *Lancet* **1994**, *344*, 905–909.
- 6 (26) World Health Organization, *Guidelines for Safe Recreational Water Environments, Volume*
7 *1: Coastal and Fresh Waters*, WHO: Geneva, 2003.
- 8 (27) Cabelli, V. J.; Dufour, A. P.; McCabe, L. J.; Levin, M. A. Swimming associated
9 gastroenteritis and water quality. *Am. J. Epidemiol.* **1982**, *115*, 606-616.
- 10 (28) Kay, D.; Bartram, J.; Prüss, A.; Ashbolt, N.; Wyer, M. D.; Fleisher, J. M.; Fewtrell, L.;
11 Rogers, A.; Rees, G. Derivation of numerical values for the World Health Organization
12 guidelines for recreational waters, *Water Res.* **2004**, *38*, 1296–1304.
- 13 (29) Kay, D.; Ashbolt, N.; Wyer, M. D.; Fleisher, J. M.; Fewtrell, L.; Rogers, A.; Rees, G. Reply
14 to comments on “Derivation of numerical values for the World Health Organization
15 guidelines for recreational waters”, *Water Res.* **2006**, *40*, 1921 – 1925.
- 16 (30) Muggelstone, M.A.; Stutt., E.D.; Rushton, L. Setting microbiological water quality
17 standards for sea bathing – a critical evaluation, *Water Sci. Technol.* **2001**, *43*, 9-18.
- 18 (31) Wymer, L.J.; Dufour, A. P.; Caldron, R. L.; Wade, T. J.; Beach, M. “Comment on
19 ‘Derivation of numerical values for the World Health Organization guidelines for
20 recreational waters’”. *Water Res.* **2005**, *39*, 2774–2777.
- 21 (32) Colford, J. M., Jr.; Wade, T. J.; Schiff, K. C.; Wright, C. C.; Griffith, J. G.; Sandhu, S. K.;
22 Burns S.; Hayes, J.; Sobsey, M.; Lovelace, G.; Weisberg, S. B. Water quality indicators

- 1 and the risk of illness at non-point source beaches in Mission Bay, California, *Epidemiol.*
2 **2006**, (in press).
- 3 (33) *Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses*, EPA 240-R-00-003, U.S. Environmental
4 Protection Agency: Washington, D.C., 2000.
- 5 (34) Brookshire, D. S.; Neill, H. R. Benefit transfer: conceptual and empirical issues. *Water*
6 *Resour. Res.* **1992**, 28, 651-655.
- 7 (35) Johnson, F.R.; Fries, E.E.; Banzhaf, H.S. Valuing morbidity: an integration of willingness-
8 to-pay and health status index literatures, *J. Health Econ.* **1997**, 16, 641-665.
- 9 (36) Kildow, J.; Pendleton, L. The non-market value of beach recreation in California, *Shore &*
10 *Beach* **2006**, 74, 34-37.

11
12
13

1 **TABLES & FIGURES**

2

FIB group	# samples over SSS	# samples over GMS	# consecutive samples over SSS	# consecutive samples over GMS
ENT	30	55	11	48
FC	18	0	5	0
TC	13	0	4	0

3

4 Table 1. Summary of water quality exceedances at HSB for the 71 when water samples were
5 taken between 29 May 2000 and 4 September 2000. Four stations were sampled on each day,
6 leading to a total of 284 observations. SSS is single sample standard, GMS is 30-day geometric
7 mean standard. For explanations of these CA beach water quality standards, see SI. Note that the
8 TC SSS exceedances include those that occur when the FC/TC ratio is greater than
9 0.1. Consecutive samples are counted if there was an exceedance the previous time a sample was
10 collected.

11

1 Figure Captions

2

3 1. The excess risk of GI as a function of ENT density using models C and K over the ENT
4 ranges available at HSB.

5

6 2. Schematic map of field site. The assumed distributions of water quality (FIB_k) and
7 potential swimmer (S_k) are shown for the region surrounding each monitoring station.


8

9 3. GI d^{-1} projected under each management scenario by epidemiology equation.

10

11 4. Estimated net economic benefit to potential swimmers per day under each management
12 scenario by epidemiology equation.


1



2
3
4
5
6

Figure 1.
Rabinovici et al.

1



2

3

4

5


6

7

Figure 2.


8

Rabinovici et al.



1
 2
 3
 4 Figure 3.
 5 Rabinovici et al.

1



2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Figure 4.
Rabinovici et al.

1 **Supporting Information**

2
3 **FIB Data**

4 Samples for total coliform (TC), fecal coliform (FC), and enterococci (ENT) observations were
5 collected in the morning five days per week (excluding Friday and Sunday) from four sampling
6 stations at Huntington State Beach (0N, 3N, 6N, and 9N) (*I*). Water quality monitoring stations
7 are located at 3,000 foot intervals along the shore and are named according to their distance from
8 the Santa Ana River (e.g. station 6N is 6,000 feet north of the river).

9
10 The water samples were analyzed using standard methods for TC and FC published by the
11 American Public Health Association and EPA method 1600 for ENT. TC and FC are reported
12 within the range of 20 to 16,000 colony forming units (CFU) per 100 mL while ENT
13 concentrations are reported between 2 and 400 CFU/100 mL. When the lower (upper) limit of
14 detection was exceeded (as reported by the monitoring agency), it was replaced with the lower
15 (upper) detection limit. High ENT pollution incidents were more frequent in 2000 than in 2001–
16 2004, when HSB experienced lower median ENT levels and narrower inter-quartile ranges, but
17 less frequent than in 1999 (data not shown).

18
19 **California’s Beach Water Quality Laws**

20 Single sample (SS) standards require advisory the beach if a sample of beach water contains TC,
21 FC, or ENT in excess of 10,000, 400, and 104 colony forming units (CFU)/100 mL, respectively
22 (2). A more stringent SS standard for TC of 1000 CFU/100 mL is applicable if the FC to TC
23 ratio is greater than 0.1. Geometric mean (GM) standards require the beach to be posted if the

1 geometric mean of TC, FC, or ENT over five equally spaced samples taken within the previous
2 30 days, including the most recent sample, is in excess of 1000, 200, or 35 CFU/100 mL,
3 respectively. California's guidelines are consistent with but slightly more stringent than current
4 federal rules for recreational water quality (3). Even though there are multiple fecal indicators
5 and rules used to trigger a advisory in the first two of our scenarios, each station day is assigned
6 only one of the two possible values (0 or 1) using the indicator variable P_k .

8 **Beach Visitor Swimming Behavior**

9 In doing our comparative analysis of beach policies, we make a series of assumptions regarding
10 the number and type of visitors exposed to ocean water at HSB. The lifeguard counting
11 techniques in the Morton and Pendelton study we cite included estimating attendance from the
12 lifeguard towers, parking, bike rack usage, and bus line capacity. We found the recent swimming
13 percent value of Wade et al. to be reasonable, since Pendleton et al. found that in the summer
14 season of 1999, 38.5% of beach goers in Orange County had significant contact with the water
15 (includes bathing, swimming, surfing and body boarding) during their beach visit (4). In 1997,
16 Pendleton counted a 35.9% average rate of head-immersion swimming at 15 beaches in Santa
17 Monica Bay (5). In summer 2000, the number of visitors to HSB does not appear atypical in any
18 way when compared to attendance from 1998 and 1999 (data not shown).

19
20 We assume that potential swimmers do not move to another region to swim or choose a different
21 form of recreation if their region is under and advisory. Substitution behavior is not considered,
22 despite some evidence that southern California beachgoers substitute at the regional scale (6).
23 We also assume that the recreational benefit experienced by potential swimmers is not affected

1 by advisories at regions other than their intended recreational site. These simplifying
2 assumptions are made necessary by the fact that how potential swimmers respond to or change
3 their behavior based on advisories at ocean beaches has not yet been modeled at the beach scale.
4
5 We acknowledge that the station-exposure assumptions produce an imprecise estimate, but deem
6 it the best approach given the available data. The assumption that all swimmers for a particular
7 day are exposed to the ENT concentration measured in the morning at the closest monitoring
8 station reflects the approximation made in actual management practice. The effect of this
9 assumption is ambiguous but probably conservative, since some studies have found FIB levels to
10 be higher in the morning than mid-day (7).

11

12 Monitoring Costs

13 Monitoring costs are rough estimates based on the personal experience of the authors. We
14 include labor costs for the collection and processing of three different FIB samples from four
15 monitoring stations at HSB (for a total of twelve analyses), and the cost of supplies for each
16 sample. These estimates do not take into account capital investment, equipment maintenance,
17 and administrative costs of monitoring programs. We argue that these rough estimates are
18 reasonable, especially since we later show that monitoring costs play a minor role in the policy
19 preference ranking compared to the health and recreational trade-offs involved.

20

21 Non-Market Valuation and Transfer Policy Analysis

22 There is limited but consistent evidence that water quality affects the benefits that individuals
23 derive from outdoor swim recreation (8-12). Relevant insights from this literature include the

1 following: studies in the US and Europe show that people on average value each swim
2 experience at about \$4 to \$50 (12); individual valuations vary based on income, gender, race,
3 worldview, and other factors; valuations are sensitive to survey and modeling methods and
4 specification; perception of water quality may matter as much as actual water quality; and
5 willingness to pay for improvements in beach water quality are modest on a per person basis,
6 adding about 30% of the total consumer surplus (8), but can become highly relevant to society if
7 the beach is visited by many people.

8

9 In general, non-market valuation (NMV) has been a major area of research in environmental and
10 health economics over the past thirty years (for a review of the development of NVM and its
11 influence on environmental policy (see, e.g., (13)). The act of taking findings from NMV studies
12 and using them to make a value estimate for some distinct place, time, and policy context is
13 referred to as benefit transfer (BT) (14).

14

15 There is considerable debate in the small but growing BT literature about the conditions under
16 which transfer methods are valid and justifiable. Repeated negative findings about the
17 generalizability of environmental activity benefit estimates have led some to conclude that the
18 transfer of unadjusted mean values (point transfer) or even value estimation models (function
19 transfer) are not supported (15). Hypothesis tests of difference in means or difference in
20 coefficients are often rejected. However, there is disagreement about whether the null hypothesis
21 should really be *equality* of values across sites and circumstances, as is often assumed (16).

22

1 Benefit transfer experts urge analysts to consider the validity and accuracy of transfer results
2 explicitly with regard to the policy objective at hand (14), a principle sometimes called the
3 “importance test”. Point transfer of mean values is the simplest possible transfer procedure, but
4 provides useful guidance regarding the general magnitude of the relevant welfare effects. To give
5 a general idea of the level of accuracy documented in past tests of BT methodologies, a meta-
6 analysis of seven BT point estimate studies found a maximum error of 56%, and errors were
7 concentrated on the up- side (17). In other words, BT estimates tend to be under (not over)
8 estimates. In one of the few examples specific to beach recreation and measurement of
9 willingness to pay to avoid swimming-related health effects, Barton and Mourato (2003) found
10 benefit function transfer errors to be on the order of 6 to 130 percent between beaches in a lesser
11 developed (Costa Rica) versus a developed nation (Portugal) (18).

12
13 For this analysis, we assume a constant per person benefit of swim recreation to each and every
14 adult that swims and treat the difference in utility of swimming in dirtier waters solely through
15 the change in health state as a function of the indicator level. This is reasonable since the
16 microbial pollution at issue here does nothing to change the immediate appearance or sensorial
17 qualities of the water. We deem point transfers sufficient for this transfer policy analysis because
18 we had values from contemporary local studies available for transfer. Importantly, the original
19 recreation demand and cost of illness studies we cite can reasonably be assumed to cover an
20 analogous population to the case study site.

21
22 Because this policy analysis is designed to produce a preference ranking of policies,
23 accompanied by a sensitivity analyses that helps stakeholders judge whether even a worst case

1 error in benefit estimation would reverse the conclusion, use of mean estimates is justified (18).
2 We acknowledge the uncertainties created by using BT, and there are other uncertainties inherent
3 to transfer policy analysis. However, by assembling a comparative analysis with the best
4 available estimates for microbial, epidemiologic, behavioral, and economic parameters, our
5 intent is to uncover the relative importance of the different sources of uncertainties in influencing
6 the cost-effectiveness of an emerging technology and on outcomes of a beach management
7 decision-making process.

8

9 **Monte Carlo Simulations and Hypothetical Analysis**

10 We used a Monte Carlo simulation to test the sensitivity of net benefit welfare outcomes to the
11 distribution of water quality data. We did this to assess the generalizability of our findings to
12 beaches with different water quality profiles and to determine whether particular water quality
13 distributions favor RD over SP.

14

15 We simulated ENT densities using several different distributions (including beta, normal,
16 gamma, and Weibull). A beta distribution was the best fit to the water quality data collected at
17 Huntington State Beach (HSB), and thus was adopted to further explore how water quality
18 distributions impacted the performance of RD over SP (data not shown). The beta distribution
19 has two control parameters ($\alpha > 0$ and $\beta > 0$) that together govern the skew and spread of the
20 distribution. The absolute magnitude of the parameters determines the spread and the relative
21 magnitude determines the skew (larger α skews to the left, larger β to the right). The probability
22 distribution function (PDF) is governed by the following expression

23
$$PDF(x) = \frac{x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1}}{B(\alpha, \beta)} \tag{S1}$$

1 where B is the beta function (or the Euler integral of the first kind) and x varies from 0 to 1. The
2 cumulative distribution function (CDF) is given by

$$3 \quad CDF(x) = I_x(\alpha, \beta) \quad (S2)$$

4 where I_x is the regularized incomplete beta function. Figure S1 shows a number of example
5 CDFs for the beta distribution. The mean (μ) and variance (σ^2) of a beta distribution are defined
6 as follows:

$$7 \quad \mu = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \quad (S3a)$$

$$8 \quad \sigma^2 = \frac{\alpha\beta}{(\alpha + \beta)^2(\alpha + \beta + 1)} \quad (S3b)$$

9
10 Beta distributions with specific means (ranging from 1 to 100 CFU/100 mL in increments of 1)
11 and variances (ranging from 100 to 10,000 (CFU/100 mL)² in increments of 100) were sampled
12 randomly to create fifty 71 day long data series of ENT densities. In total, 500,000 data series
13 were generated. The volatility (V) of each hypothetical data series was determined as follows:

$$14 \quad V = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=2}^N (P_t - P_{t-1})^2 \quad (S4)$$

15 where N is the number of data points (in our case $N=71$) and P_t is 1 or 0 if the ENT density of the
16 randomly generated data series is greater than the single sample standard for ENT (104 CFU/100
17 mL). Volatility describes the percent of ENT measurements that give rise to a change in posting
18 status. The average volatility of the fifty data series generated from a single beta distribution
19 were averaged to obtain the expected volatility.


20

1 A benefits transfer analysis was used to determine if RD was net beneficial to society than SP for
2 each of the 500,000 data series using the methods described in the main paper text with the
3 following simplifying assumptions: (1) 2500 visitors per day were present at the beach with the
4 generated water quality distribution – a similar number that is present at a single station within
5 HSB, (2) only the ENT single-sample standard was used to determine the posting status at the
6 beach, and (3) compliance was equal to 50%. In addition, a central assumption for this analysis is
7 that water quality data is indeed random. No autocorrelation between measurements existed in
8 the generated hypothetical distributions, whereas in actual data collected from southern
9 California beaches, there is a significant autocorrelation that has a direct effect on the relative
10 advantage of rapid detection versus 24-hour lagged testing methods. The percent of the fifty
11 simulations for each beta distribution that indicated RD was more net beneficial than SP was
12 recorded.




13
14 Figure S2 shows the relative likelihood of RD dominating SP as a color scale value for beta
15 distributions with a designated mean and variance using models C (top) and K (bottom). Purple
16 represents the highest probability of RD being more beneficial than SP and red represents the
17 highest probability of SP being more beneficial than RD. The transition from green to light blue
18 indicates where RD has a 50% chance of providing greater net benefits relative to SP. Figure S3
19 shows the average volatility (shown as a color scale) for the data series generated from beta
20 distributions as a function of mean and variance.

21
22 A comparison of Figures S2 and S3 indicates that when ENT series have low volatility that SP is
23 more likely to win over RD. For model C (top panel of Figure S2), when the volatility is more

1 than about 0.20, RD wins over SP. For model K (bottom panel of Figure S2), RD wins over SP
2 for volatility over 0.04. The differences in the threshold volatilities between the models arises
3 because risk is a much weaker function of ENT density for model C than for model K. It should
4 be noted that in our hypothetical simulation, we held attendance constant. If day-to-day
5 attendance were variable, then this may change relative performance of RD and SP.



1
2 Figure S1. Example beta cumulative distribution functions (CDFs). Here, $\alpha + \beta = 1.3$, and α is
3 varied from 1.2 (right most curve) to 0.1 (left most curve) in 0.1 increments.



4


5

6 Figure S2. The probability of RD providing greater net benefit than SP for hypothetical beta

7 ENT distributions. Top and bottom plot are results for models C and K, respectively. The grey

8 background delineates combinations between means and variances for which beta distributions

9 do not exist. Mathematically, this region is where α and β are less than or equal to 0.



1

2 Figure S3. The volatility (V) for each of the beta distributions.

1 Literature Cited

- 2 (1) Orange County Sanitation District, http://www.ocsd.com/about/reports/lab_archive.asp
- 3 (2) California State Department of Health Services. Statutes of 1997. Health and Safety Code
4 §115880. Assembly Bill 411, Chapter 765.
- 5 (3) U. S. EPA, Water Quality Standards for Coastal and Great Lakes Recreation Waters,
6 Federal Register: November 16, 2004, 69(220), 67217-43.
- 7 (4) Pendleton, L.; Martin, N.; Webster, D. G. Public perceptions of environmental quality: a
8 survey study of beach use and perceptions in Los Angeles County, *Marine Pollution*
9 *Bulletin* **2001**, *42*, 1155-1160.
- 10 (5) Pendleton, L. Managing beach amenities to reduce exposure to coastal hazards: storm water
11 pollution, *Coastal Manage.* **2001**, *29*, 239-252.
- 12 (6) Hanemann, W. M.; Pendleton, L.; Mohn, C.; Hilger, J.; Kurisawa, K.; Layton, D.; Vasquez,
13 F. *Using Revealed Preference Models to Estimate the Affect of Coastal Water Quality on*
14 *Beach Choice in Southern California*; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
15 The California State Water Resources Control Board, California Department of Fish and
16 Game: Sacramento, CA, 2004.
- 17 (7) Boehm, A. B.; Grant, S. B.; Kim, J. H.; Mowbray, S. L.; McGee, C. D.; Clark, C. D.; Foley,
18 D. M.; Wellman, D. E. Decadal and shorter period variability of surf zone water quality at
19 Huntington Beach, California. *Environ. Sci. Technol.* **2002**, *36*, 3885-3892.
- 20 (8) Freeman, A. M., III The benefits of water quality improvements for marine recreation: a
21 review of empirical evidence, *Mar Res. Econ.* 1995, *10*, 385-406.

- 1 (9) Georgiou, S.; Langford, I. H.; Bateman, I. J.; Turner, R. K. Determinants of individuals'
2 willingness to pay for perceived reductions in environmental health risks: a case study of
3 bathing water quality, *Environ. and Planning A* **1998**, *30*, 577-594.
- 4 (10) Jiang, Y.; Swallow, S.K.; McGonagle, M.P. Context-specific benefit transfer using stated
5 choice models: specification and convergent validity for policy analysis, *Environ. Resour.*
6 *Econ.* **2005**, *31*, 477-499.
- 7 (11) Rosenberger; R. S.; Loomis, J. B. Using meta-analysis for benefits transfer: in-sample
8 convergent validity tests of an outdoor recreation database. *Water Resour. Res.* **2000**, *36*,
9 1097.
- 10 (12) Machado, F.S.; Mourato, S. Evaluating the multiple benefits of marine water quality
11 improvements: how important are health risk reductions? *J. Environ. Manage.* **2002**, *65*,
12 239-250.
- 13 (13) Smith, V.K. JEEM and non-market valuation: 1974–1998, *J. of Environ. Econ. Manage.*
14 **2000**, *39*, 351-374.
- 15 (14) Brookshire, D. S.; Neill, H. R. Benefit transfer: conceptual and empirical issues. *Water*
16 *Resour. Res.* **1992**, *28*, 651-655.
- 17 (15) Bergstrom, J. C.; De Civita, P. Status of benefits transfer in the United States and Canada: a
18 review. *Can. J. Agric. Econ.* **1999**, *47*, 79-87.
- 19 (16) Kristofersson, D.; Navrud, S. Validity test of benefit transfer: are we performing the wrong
20 tests? *Environ. Resour. Econ.* **2005**, *30*, 279-286.
- 21 (17) Brouwer, R. Environmental value transfer: state of the art and future prospects. *Environ.*
22 *Econ.* **2000**, *32*, 137-152.

- 1 (18) Barton, D.N.; Mourato, S. Transferring the benefits of avoided health effects from water
2 pollution between Portugal and Costa Rica. *Environ. Development Econ.* **2003**, 8, 351-371.
- 3 (19) Brookshire, D. S.; Neill, H. R. Benefit transfer: conceptual and empirical issues. *Water*
4 *Resour. Res.* **1992**, 28, 651-655.
- 5 (20) Kay, D.; Fleisher, J. M.; Salmon, R. L.; Wyer, M. D.; Godfree, A. F.; Zelenauch-Jacquotte,
6 Z.; Shore, R. Predicting likelihood of gastroenteritis from sea bathing: results from
7 randomized exposure, *Lancet* **1994**, 344, 905–909.
- 8