

# Solutions to Problem Set 8

ARE 261

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## Question 1

1. The dynamic programming equation (DPE) for the control problem is

$$-J_t(x_t, t) = \max_{u_t} \left\{ -\frac{1}{2}e^{-rt}(u_t^2 + x_t^2) + J_x(x_t, t)(x_t + u_t) \right\} \quad (1)$$

where  $J(x_t, t)$  is the value function, and  $J_t(x_t, t)$  and  $J_x(x_t, t)$  are partial derivatives of the value function.

2.  $J(x_T, T) = -e^{-rT} \frac{ax_T^2}{2}$ .
3. Substitute the guess for the value function, that is  $J(x_t, t) = s(t) \frac{x_t^2}{2}$ , into the DPE, differentiate with respect to  $u_t$ , and set the expression to zero. Note that  $J_t(x_t, t) = \dot{s} \frac{x_t^2}{2}$  and  $J_x(x_t, t) = sx$ . This gives the following policy function

$$u_t = e^{rt} s(t) x_t \quad (2)$$

Substitute the optimal policy function into the DPE. This in turns gives the differential equation that solves  $s(t)$

$$\dot{s} = -e^{rt} s^2 + e^{-rt} - 2s_t \quad (3)$$

With the boundary condition that  $s(T) = -ae^{-rT}$ . It is easier to work with a transformation of  $s(t)$ . Let  $z(t) = e^{rt} s(t)$ . Then

$$\frac{dz}{dt} = -z(t)^2 - (2-r)z(t) + 1 \quad (4)$$


With the boundary condition that  $z_T = -a$ .

4.  $\lambda_t$  from the Maximum Principle is equal to  $J_x(x_t, t)$  from the DPE.
5. We already have an autonomous differential equation in  $z(t)$ . By solving this equation “backwards” we convert the boundary condition at the terminal period into a boundary condition at the initial time. Redefine

the differential equation for  $z(t)$  in terms of  $\tau$  where  $\tau = T - t$ , the time remaining. In terms of  $\tau$  the differential equation is

$$\frac{dz}{d\tau} = z(\tau)^2 + (2 - r)z(\tau) - 1 \quad (5)$$

This equation has two steady states, one positive and one negative. These are solved for by setting  $\frac{dz}{d\tau} = 0$  and then solving the quadratic in  $z$ . The positive root is equal to  $z_1 = \frac{-(2-r) + \sqrt{(2-r)^2 + 4}}{2}$  and the negative root is equal to  $z_2 = \frac{-(2-r) - \sqrt{(2-r)^2 + 4}}{2}$ . The negative root is stable while the positive root is unstable. The figure shows the graph of  $\frac{dz}{d\tau} = 0$  for  $r = 1$




In the steady state, we have

$$s^* = z_2 e^{-rt},$$

so

$$\frac{ds}{dt} = -r z_2 e^{-rt} = -rs$$



6. So long as the initial point  $-a$  lies to the left of the positive root  $z_1$ , the differential equation for  $s$  will converge to the steady state as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ . This implies that if  $a > -z_1$  then the differential equation will converge.
7. By part 3, equation (2), the optimal control rule is

$$\begin{aligned} u_t &= e^{rt} s(t) x_t \\ &= z_2 x_t. \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{with } z_2 = \frac{-(2-r) - \sqrt{(2-r)^2 + 4}}{2}.$$

The derivative is:

$$\frac{dz_2}{dr} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} [(2-r)^2 + 4]^{-1/2} (2-r) > 0$$

Confirm that this expression is positive by noting:

$$\begin{aligned} ((2-r)^2 + 4) &> (2-r)^2 \Rightarrow \\ ((2-r)^2 + 4)^{1/2} &> -(2-r) \Rightarrow \\ 1 &> -((2-r)^2 + 4)^{-1/2} (2-r) \Rightarrow \\ 1 + ((2-r)^2 + 4)^{-1/2} (2-r) &> 0 \end{aligned}$$

Since  $u = z_2 x$ , conclude that

$$\text{sign } \frac{\partial u}{\partial r} = \text{sign } x.$$

## Question 2

Let  $J(1)$  denote the value when the state is bad and  $J(0)$  the value when the state is good. From the set up its easy to see that

$$x^* = 0 \quad (\text{bad state})$$

$$J(1) = \frac{D_b}{1 - \beta} \quad (6)$$

$$J(0) = \min_{x_t} \{c(x_t) + \beta(1 - p(x_t))J(0) + \beta p(x_t)J(1)\} \quad (7)$$

Derive the first order condition for the second DPE. This gives

$$\frac{dc(x_t)}{dx_t} + \beta \frac{dp(x_t)}{dx_t} [J(1) - J(0)] = 0 \quad (8)$$

Let  $f(x, J(0), J(1), \beta)$  denote the left hand side of the first order condition. Totally differentiating  $f$  and then rearranging the terms gives

$$\frac{df}{d\beta} = f_x \frac{dx}{d\beta} + f_\beta + f_{J(0)} \frac{dJ(0)}{d\beta} + f_{J(1)} \frac{dJ(1)}{d\beta} = 0 \quad (9)$$

From the first order condition

$$f_x = \frac{d^2c(x)}{dx^2} + \beta(J(1) - J(0))\frac{d^2p(x)}{dx^2} \quad (10)$$

$$f_\beta = \frac{dp(x)}{dx}(J(1) - J(0)) \quad (11)$$

$$f_{J(0)} = -\beta\frac{dp(x)}{dx} \quad (12)$$

$$f_{J(1)} = \beta\frac{dp(x)}{dx} \quad (13)$$

Note that  $f_x \geq 0$  from the second order condition. We still need to compute the differential of the value functions with respect to  $\beta$ . From the expression for  $J(1)$  it is easy to see that

$$\frac{\partial J(1)}{\partial \beta} = \frac{D_b}{(1-\beta)^2} \geq 0 \quad (14)$$

For  $J(0)$  we use the dynamic envelope theorem on the DPE (7) after we have substituted for the optimal policy function. This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial J(0)}{\partial \beta} &= (1-p(x))J(0) + p(x)J(1) \\ &+ \beta \left[ p(x)\frac{D_b}{(1-\beta)^2} + (1-p(x))\frac{\partial J(0)}{\partial \beta} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

It gives

$$\frac{\partial J(0)}{\partial \beta} = \frac{(1-p)J(0) + \frac{p}{1-\beta}J(1)}{1-\beta(1-p)} > 0. \quad (15)$$

After making all the substitutions into (9) and after a lot of simplification we get

$$\frac{dx}{d\beta} = -\frac{\frac{dp(x)}{dx}(J(1) - J(0))}{[1-\beta(1-p)]f_x} \quad (16)$$

To see the sign of those terms in  $\frac{dx}{d\beta}$ :

$$f_x = \frac{d^2c(x)}{dx^2} + \beta(J(1) - J(0))\frac{d^2p(x)}{dx^2} > 0, \quad (\text{by } S.O.C.)$$

$$\frac{dp(x)}{dx}(J(1) - J(0)) = -\frac{1}{\beta}\frac{dc(x_t)}{dx_t} < 0, \quad (\text{by } F.O.C.)$$

Consequently,

$$\frac{dx}{d\beta} > 0.$$

As  $\beta$  increases the agent chooses to increase  $x$ . Higher discount factor increases the optimal abatement under a good state.

### Question 3

1. The farmer wants to pick an action,  $x$ , to maximize the sum of profits subject to the equation of motion for soil quality.

$$\max_{\{x_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi(S_t, x_t) \quad (17)$$

subject to

$$S_{t+1} = f(S_t, x_t) \quad (18)$$

2. The corresponding DPE is

$$V(S_t) = \max_{x_t} \pi(S_t, x_t) + \beta V(S_{t+1}) \quad (19)$$

where  $V$  denotes the value function.

3. The following steps are involved in solving for the Euler equation.

- Solve for the first order condition
- Solve for the envelope condition
- Advance both the first order and the envelope condition one period
- Eliminate the Value function from the advanced envelope condition

We begin by differentiating the DPE with respect to  $x_t$  and setting the expression to zero. This gives

$$V'(S_{t+1}) = -\frac{\frac{\partial \pi(S_t, x_t)}{\partial x_t}}{\beta \frac{\partial f(S_t, x_t)}{\partial x_t}} \quad (20)$$

The envelope condition (using the envelope theorem and treating the state as a parameter) is

$$V'(S_t) = \frac{\partial \pi(S_t, x_t)}{\partial S_t} + \beta V'(S_{t+1}) \frac{\partial f(S_t, x_t)}{\partial S_t} \quad (21)$$

Next advance the first order condition and the envelope condition one period. This gives,

$$V'(S_{t+2}) = -\frac{\frac{\partial \pi(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial x_{t+1}}}{\beta \frac{\partial f(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial x_{t+1}}} \quad (22)$$

$$V'(S_{t+1}) = \frac{\partial \pi(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} + \beta V'(S_{t+2}) \frac{\partial f(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \quad (23)$$

Finally we use the equations we have to eliminate value function from the advanced envelope condition. This gives the Euler equation as

$$-\frac{\frac{\partial \pi(S_t, x_t)}{\partial x_t}}{\beta \frac{\partial f(S_t, x_t)}{\partial x_t}} = \frac{\partial \pi(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} - \frac{\frac{\partial \pi(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial x_{t+1}}}{\frac{\partial f(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial x_{t+1}}} \frac{\partial f(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \quad (24)$$

or

$$-\frac{\pi_x(S_t, x_t)}{f_x(S_t, x_t)} = \beta \left\{ \pi_s(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) - \frac{\pi_x(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})}{f_x(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1})} f_s(S_{t+1}, x_{t+1}) \right\}$$

4. At the steady state  $S_t = S_{t+1} = S$  and  $x_t = x_{t+1} = x$ . These values are solved for by solving the equation of motion and the Euler equation at the steady state. These are

$$S = f(S, x) \quad (25)$$

$$-\frac{\pi_x(S, x)}{f_x(S, x)} = \beta \left\{ \pi_s(S, x) - \frac{\pi_x(S, x)}{f_x(S, x)} f_s(S, x) \right\} \quad (26)$$

## Question 4

1. The optimal control problem is

$$\max_{\{h_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(h_t) \quad (27)$$

subject to

$$S_{t+1} = (S_t - h_t)^\alpha \quad (28)$$

2. The corresponding DPE, where  $V$  denotes the value function, is

$$V(S_t) = \max_{h_t} \log(h_t) + \beta V(S_{t+1}) \quad (29)$$

while the boundary condition is that  $h_T = S_T$  which implies that  $V(S_T) = \log(S_T)$ .

3. An inductive proof involves three steps:

- Show that the guessed form is true for  $\tau = 0$
- Assume that the guessed form is true for  $\tau = s$
- Show that the guessed form is true for  $\tau = s + 1$

where  $\tau = T - t$ , the time to go and the guess is that  $V(S_\tau) = A_{0\tau} + A_\tau \log(S_\tau)$ . Now  $\tau = 0$  when  $t = T$ . Consequently,  $V(S_{\tau=0}) = V(S_T) = \log(S_T)$ . So when  $\tau = 0$  the value function has the guessed form with  $A_{00} = 0$  and  $A_0 = 1$ . Now assume that the guessed form is true for  $\tau = s$ . This implies that  $V(S_s) = A_{0s} + A_s \log(S_s)$ . Finally we need to show that the guessed form is true for  $\tau = s + 1$ . Write the DPE going forward but in terms of  $s$  and  $s + 1$  (note that in terms of  $t$ ,  $s + 1 < s$ ). This gives

$$V(S_{s+1}) = \max_{h_{s+1}} \log(h_{s+1}) + \beta V(S_s) \quad (30)$$

Substitute in for  $V(S_s)$  and  $S_s = (S_{s+1} - h_{s+1})^\alpha$  and then derive the first order condition. This gives

$$\frac{1}{h_{s+1}} - \frac{\alpha\beta A_s}{S_{s+1} - h_{s+1}} = 0 \quad (31)$$

Which in turn implies that  $h_{s+1} = \frac{S_{s+1}}{1 + \alpha\beta A_s}$ . Substitute this back into the DPE. This gives

$$\begin{aligned} V(S_{s+1}) = & \log(S_{s+1}) - \log(1 + \alpha\beta A_s) + \beta A_{0s} + \\ & \beta\alpha A_s [\log(S_{s+1}) + \log(\alpha\beta A_s) - \log(1 + \alpha\beta A_s)] \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

This has the guessed functional form so long as

$$\begin{aligned} A_{0s+1} &= \beta A_{0s} + \beta\alpha A_s \log(\alpha\beta A_s) - (1 + \alpha\beta A_s) \log(1 + \alpha\beta A_s) \\ A_{s+1} &= 1 + \alpha\beta A_s \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

Then  $V(S_{s+1}) = A_{0s+1} + A_{s+1} \log(S_{s+1})$ .

4. The last two equations are the difference equations for  $A_{0\tau}$  and  $A_\tau$ . The control rule is given by

$$h_{\tau+1} = \frac{S_{\tau+1}}{1 + \alpha\beta A_\tau} \quad (34)$$

The change in the fraction of the stock harvested depends on the change in  $A_\tau$ . From the difference equation we know that  $A_{\tau+1} > A_\tau$ . This implies that as the time remaining increases the agent harvests a larger share of the stock. Alternatively, the share harvested decreases as  $t \rightarrow T$ . To ensure that the steady state of the difference equation for  $A_\tau$  (33) is stable, it must be true that the difference equation cuts the 45° line from above. This requires that  $\alpha\beta < 1$ . Assuming non-negative harvesting in the steady state, the growth equation (28) requires  $\alpha \geq 0$ .

5. The steady state control rule for the infinite horizon is  $h = \frac{S}{1 + \alpha\beta A}$ . This is the same as the rule we would have obtained if we had started from the infinite horizon.

## Question 5

The lobby groups wants to choose  $c_t$  in every period to maximize its expected profits. This amounts to

$$\max_{c_t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [E(\text{rent}) - c_t] \quad (35)$$

The DPE when the friendly party is in office is given by

$$J(F) = \max_{c_t} \{b - c_t + \beta [p(c_t)J(F) + (1 - p(c_t))J(U)]\} \quad (36)$$

while the DPE when the unfriendly party is in office is

$$J(U) = \max_{c_t} \{-c_t + \beta [(1 - q(c_t))J(F) + q(c_t)J(U)]\} \quad (37)$$