State, Market, and Civil Institutions: History of Thought in Development Economics

Principles of analysis of history of thought in development economics

1. Link development and underdevelopment: part of a single process (from Jared Diamond to Carlo Cipolla and Paul Bairoch: world systems)

- <u>Prima</u> de round de la prima and data systems
- <u>Normative</u>: development strategy (social project endorsed by specific group, ideological, political): objectives, strategies, policies & programs. 3. Link to periods of <u>history</u> of development: four historical periods, five major reversals in thought.

4. Not a classification of people (multifaceted and changing) but of ideas.

5. All theories feature a certain balance between market, state, and civil institutions. They are classified here according to the element among those three on which greater normative emphasis is placed.

Civil institutions	State	Market
Emphasis on:	Emphasis on:	Emphasis on:
- Corporate organizations: firms.	- Market failures: eco of scale, spillover effects,	- Behavior (consumers, firms, households,
- Associative organizations: households,	incumbent advantages, imperfect information,	politicians, bureaucrats)
communities, corporatist organizations, grassroot	transactions costs, social discount rate.	- Anonymous transactions and complete markets:
organizations, NGOs, lobbies, political parties, and	- Activist state for growth and equity.	Pareto efficiency.
social classes.	- Non-separability efficiency-equity (asset	- Harmony and just returns.
- Market <u>and</u> government failures, contracts between	ownership affects both efficiency and equity).	- Separability efficiency-equity (asset ownership
explicit agents, structure of institutions and	- Role of quality of governance.	affects equity but not efficiency).
organizations. Determinants of cooperation. Power,	- Role of initial conditions: institutions, assets	- Government failures (non-poverty reducing
bargaining, and struggles	inequality	inefficiencies).

I. 1700-1890: Classical industrial revolutions. (1) 1700-1750-1820: "British Experience". (2) 1820-1890: from France (1820) to Japan (1880): "Western Experience".

 (4) European socialists & populists Reject values of capitalism. Communal, decentralized, minimal state. Set examples. Sismondi: peasants and artisans. Owen, Fourier: cooperatives and phalansteries Proudhon: small scale firms. Chernyskevski: repartitional commune & Russian mir Hirschaman: "The Passions and the Interests". (5) (Marx, Vol I (1867): positive analysis only) Poverty of workers. Class struggle. Role of power. 	 (3) Relative economic backwardness (REB) and catching-up strategies through state intervention in market economies: from France (1820) to Japan (1880) Roles of agriculture, protectionism, technology, colonialism and forced savings, industrialization imperative (Gerschenkron and theory of substitutes). "Western Experience": Germany: List and Bismark (1841). U.S.: Civil War & Hamilton (1861). Russia: Witte, abolition of serfdom. Japan: Meiji (1880). Puzzle: Why not China? (Justin Lin). 	 (1) Antecedents Mercantilists (monopolistic trade, colonial accumulation), Physiocrats (agriculture): role of agricultural revolution (1700) Types of colonies: extraction and settlement. (2) Classical political economy and industrial revolution in England (1750-1800) Division of labor, comparative advantage and trade, Manchester Doctrine (1847) & repeal of Corn Laws, British industrialization experience. Adam Smith (1776): individual and market. Malthus (1798): population, subsistence wages, rents for luxury goods market. Ricardo (1817): comp. adv. and trade, profits as opposed to rents, Manchester.
II. 1890-WWII: Colonialism and classical (9) Populists Chayanov (1925) and the Narodniks: peasant households and communities with no labor market.	 imperialism: First liberal period and "Sov (7) Classics of imperialism Uneven development and catching-up through market and FDI. Predict transitions to socialism in MDCs due to growth with poverty of workers. Luxemburg (1910), Lenin (1914), Bucharin (1914) (8) Catching up with command economies: Soviet model (1929) Market failures and central planning: state ownership, collectivization, rapid industrialization, distributive role of the state: Preobrazhensky, Trotsky, and the Bolscheviks (NEP). Lange-Taylor-Lerner (1944) public ownership theorem: market socialism (efficiency and equity). (10) Keynesian revolution Labor market failures and role of the state in underconsumption crisis: fiscal and monetary policies, redistributive policies for growth and welfare state. Keynes (1936), Samuelson 	 viet Experience (6) Neo-classical economics Just returns, general equilibrium, separability efficiency-equity, role of entrepreneurship. Marshall (1890): supply and demand, general equilibrium. Austrian School (1890): market equilibria. Schumpeter (1911): entrepreneurship. Pigou (1912): externalities and taxation.

(continued on p.2)

III. WWII-1980: Growth and development decades: the "Asian Experience" Marshall Plan, Cold War, Third World, Keynesian revolution, United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, decolonization of Africa, East-Asian miracles

 (16) Neo-populism. Schmaker & Bhuddist economics: small is leautiful. Lipton: urban bias and smallholders. (17) Group formation & collective action for social incorporation - Hirschman "Getting Abade Collectively", "Exit, Voice and Loyalty". - Poverty due to social exclusion: need social incorporation. 	 (13) Third World socialism & radical dependency theory Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, Che Guevara, Debray, African socialism (Nkrumah), N. Korea. Role of the Soviet experience. Explain and escape from stagnation: capitalism = market integration = underdevelopment. Hence, need delinking, collectivization, forced-pace industrialization, central planning, basic needs. (14) Development economics: state for growth, development planning State for catching up: protectionism for import substitution industrialization (ISI) given market failures (entry costs and eco. of scale). 1950s: Accelerate aggregate growth Harod-Domar model: role of savings & investment, role of quality of inv. (ICOR). Mahalanobis: mixed economy planning. Aggregate investment. Aid for capital, investment, and growth within planning. 1960s: Growth, balance of payments, employment Two-gap models (domestic and foreign savings): McKinnon, Chenery. State to relax gaps. Three-gap models (same plus government budget deficit): Bacha & Taylor. Role of agriculture: Kuznets agricultural surplus (generate, transfer, invest) Dual economy models with surplus labor: Lewis, Ranis&Fei: role of savings (inequality) and low nominal wages. Lele & Mellor: role of technological change in ag. to lower nominal wages. Role of market complementarities: linkages and multipliers: Hirschman. Tipping policies. Leibenstein: critical minimum effort to escape Malthusian trap. Role of market creation (complementarities, coordination). Reformist dependency theory: ECLA, Prebisch, Cardoso: ISI. Modernizing elites (individual traits and social values): capture the state, leadership. Aid for two gaps: relax savings and current accounts constraints. Aid for agriculture (Green Revolution). (Critique of development economics: neglect of behavior, of macro fundamentals, of political economy of reform). (15) Growth-wit	 (11) Modernization theory Eurocentric and universalist, evolutionary (diffusion). Stages of growth: Rostow Normal patterns: Chenery & Taylor, Kuznets Diffusion of innovations: Rodgers (12) Neo-classical economic development (1960s) Behavioral microfoundations; government for public goods, externalities, competition, property rights, transactions costs, and equity. International convergence (Solow): decreasing returns and technology as an international public good. Role of agriculture and technological change: Jorgenson: dual economy with full employment, role of technological change in agriculture. Schultz: peasants poor but efficient with perfect markets; role of tech change. Hayami & Ruttan: induced technological innovations, role of prices in inducement. Puralist theory of the state, political markets, and government capture: Stigler, Peltzman, Becker (Chicago School). Project evaluation. Proyetty due to marginality (marginality theory): need social integration for participation and trickle-down.
	RD	

(continued on p.3)

×

IV. 1980-today: Debt crisis, stabilization, and adjustment. (1) 1980-97: Second liberal period (globalization), neo-liberal response and Washington Consensus. (2) 1997→: Critique of globalization, beyond the Washington Consensus. Debt crisis, stabilization and adjustment, end of Cold War, economic recoveries, China boom, democratization, proliferation of NGOs and GROs

Debt crisis, stabilization and adjustment, end of Cold War, economic recoveries, China boom, democratization, proliferation of NGOs and GROs				
 (25) New institutional economics Role of civil institutions in context of market and govt failures: households, extended family, firms, ROSCAS, group lending, village banks, service cooperatives, sharecropping contracts, interlinked transactions, mutual insurance networks, water users associations, etc. Role of locally public information and social capital. Role of property rights, role of culture and social norms. Second generation of reforms (Stiglitz), linkage local-global institutions. Transactions costs approach Coase, Williamson, North, Bowles. Imperfect and asymmetrical information approach Stiglitz, Akerlof, Eswaran & Kotwal, Bardhan, Basu, Bell, Besley. Microeconometrics of gender, households, contracts, communities, and agrarian institutions Rosenzweig & Foster, Udry, Fafchamps, Behrman, Strauss, D. Thomas, Newbery, Hayami & Otsuka. Heterogeneity and differentiation. Comparative historical institutional economics Nugent, Ostrom, Wade. (26) Grassroots development: New actors, new social movements, GROs and NGOs, informal sector, cooperative organizations, RD beyond the welfare state, decentralization of governance, community participation. Role of social capital. Local responses to globalization (Voices from the Commons, SID). CDD approach. IFAD, IAF: new approaches to rural development. Wade, Ostrom, Baland-Platteau: determinants of cooperation and management of CPR vs. Hardin's tragedy of the commons. Critique: communities can fail (lack of democracy, strong redistributive pressures). Devolution can fail. Decentralization can fail (leite capture) (27) Beyond development Deconstructionists: Escobar Dec-development: reduce consumption. 	 (21) Endogenous growth: Spillovers and multiple equilibria. Role of initial conditions. Role of state due to market failures. Increasing returns (I in physical K: Arrow, Arthur) & externalities (R&D, education: P.Roemer, Lucas, Mankiv): private underinvestment. ISI successfully used in E.Asia (Rodrik). Market externalities/effer, & Vishny). Institutional change: financial intermediation, lower transactions costs on markets (D. North). Barriers to the international diffusion of innovations (Baumol) Wrong initial definition of comparative advantage in ag (no eco of scale): Matsuyama lock-in. Endogenous technology and human capital; role of income distribution for savings, incentives, and market size: efficiency-equity complementarity (Aghion, Bénabou). Location theory: positive agglomeration externalities, clusters (Krugman). Divergence (critique of Solow) and conditional convergence (initial conditions, good policy): Solow, D. Roemer, J. Sachs, R. Hall). "Counter-revolution in development theory" (Krugman) or nothing new "(Bardhan). "Reversal of fortune": good institutions in settlement colonies, bad in extraction colonies, vs. geography (Acemoglu, Robinson). Cittage of role of TFP vs capital deepening: Young. (22) New international trade theory Strugman). Industrial policy beyond WTO (Rodrik) (33) New political economy Endogenous government behavior (policy making), political institutions, constitutional economics. Role of good governance complementing markets (Stiglitz). Ajd following good policies instead of conditionality lending. Seek greater aid effectiveness. Puble choice and collective action approach Cendogenous regulatory mechanisms Incentives and endogeneous regulators: Baron, Noll. Comparative historical political economy of reforms. Decentralization strategies. Comparative historical political economy of	 (18) Neo-liberal response (1980s) Efficiency objective through market forces. Critique of government intervention: government failures and inefficiencies, corruption. Rent seeking, rent dissipation, and social waste: policy distortions (Tullock, Krueger, Baghwati (DUP)) Incentive and informational problems of govt intervention: cannot solve market failures (Hayek). Effectiveness of government interventions doomed by private sector response: rational expectations (Solow, Lucas). Critique of ISI: Anti-ag & unprotected T-sectors (price distortions: direct and indirect (e): Krueger, Valdés), anti-L, foreign exchange crises & stop-go cycles, rent seeking blocks ISTE (Balessa, Little, Krueger). Open economy industrialization (OEI): role of trade (WB, Edwards). Role of FDI, WTO. Trade liberalization to reduce rent seeking (Bates). (19) Stabilization policies Debt crisis and exhaustion of ISI: inflation, BofCA deficits. Gvt budget deficits. Stabilization: Real devaluation, fiscal austerity, restrictive monetary policy, wage repression: IMF. (20) Adjustment policies, Washington Consensus Liberalization of trade and foreign investment (GATT, NAFTA), competitive exchange rate (floating), financial liberalization (emerging financial markets, banking sector reforms), balanced budget & fiscal discipline, privatization (reduce soft budget taxes): Washington Consensus, J. Williamson. Role of macrofundamentals but neglect of micro reforms and institutional reform loans, conditionality lending (WB, IMF), privatization of aid (NGO, FDI). "New economics of aid" (Dollar, Collier): failure of conditionality. Good governance and fundamentals as pre-condition. Safety nets: social funds. 		