ARE 242 -- Spring 2003

Reading List

Gordon Rausser

Tuesday/Thursday, 12:30 ö 2:00

201 Giannini

Overview

* Rausser, G.C. and R.E. Goodhue."Public Policy: Its Many Analytical Dimensions," in Handbook

of AgriculturalEconomics, B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume2, Chapter 39, ElsevierNorth Holland, 2002.

PolicyIncidence

Alston, J.M. and R. Gray. Export subsidiesand state trading: theory and application to

Canadian wheat,in T. Yildirim, A. Schmitz, and W.H. Furtan, eds., World Agricultural

Trade,Westview Press, pp. 281-298.1998.

* Alston, J.M. and J.S. James. "TheIncidence of Agricultural Policy," in Handbook of

AgriculturalEconomics, B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume2, Chapter 33, ElsevierNorth Holland, 2002.

Ê

Andrews,M.S. and G.C. Rausser. "Some Political Economy Aspects of Macroeconomic

Linkages with Agriculture," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1986), pp. 413-417.

Borges, R.B. and W.N. Thurman, 1994,"Marketing quotas and random yields: marginal effects

of inframarginalsubsidies on peanut supply," American Journal of Agricultural Economics76 (1994) 809-817.

Brandow,G.E., "Interrelations among Demands for Farm Products and Implication forControl of

Market Supply," Pennsylvania Agricultural Experiment Station,Bulletin 680. 1961.

Brandow, G.E., 1977, "Policy for commercialagriculture, 1945-71," in L.R. Martin, ed., A Survey

of AgriculturalEconomics Literature Vol. 1 (1977), Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.

BrŠnnlund, R., and B. Kristršm, "Welfaremeasurement in single and multimarket models:

theory andapplication," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78 (1996),157-165.

Brown, A.B. and L.L. Martin, "Price versusquota reductions: U.S. flue-cured tobacco

policy," Journalof Agricultural and Applied Economics, 28 (1996), 445-452.

*Chambers, R.G., "The incidence of agricultural policies," Journalof Public Economics 57, (1995)

317-335.

Dumas, C., Moss, C.B. and A.Schmitz. "Tradable Permits and Agricultural Sequestration of Carbon,"in Agricultural Globalization, Trade, and the Environment, Moss, C.B.,Rausser, G.C., Schmitz, A., Taylor, T.G. and D. Zilberman (eds.), KluwerAcademic Publishers, Massachusetts, 2001.

Feenstra, R.C., "Tradepolicy with several goods and market linkages," Journal ofInternational Economics 20 (1986), 249-267.

* Floyd, J.E. "The Effects of FarmPrice Supports on the Returns to Land and Labor in

Agriculture."Journal of Political Economy 73 (1965), p. 148-158.

Freebairn, J.W., "Reconsidering themarginal welfare cost of taxation," The Economic Record

71 (1995), 121-131.

Harberger, A.C., "Three basic postulatesfor applied welfare economics: an interpretive

essay," Journalof Economic Literature 9 (1971), 785-97.

Hertel, T.W., "Negotiating Reductions inAgricultural Support: Implications of

Technology and FactorMobility," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 3 (1989), 559ö573.

Hertel, T.W., "Factor market incidence ofagricultural trade liberalization: Some additional

results," AustralianJournal of Agricultural Economics 35 (1991), 77-107.

Hochman, E.,G.C. Rausser, and E. Comay. "The Israeli Poultry Marketing Board: Price

Production and Inventory Controls," in Applied StochasticControl in Econometrics and Management Science, A. Bensoussan, P.Kliendorfer and C.S. Tapiero (eds.). Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.,1980, Chapter 1, pp.1-38.

*Innes, R.D. and G.C. Rausser, "Incomplete markets and governmentagricultural policy,"

American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 71 (1989), 915-931.

Just, R.E., and D.L. Hueth, 1979,"Multimarket welfare measurement," American Economic

Review69 (1979), 947-954.

Just, R.E., and G.C. Rausser, "Uncertaineconomic environments and conditional policies,"

Chapter 5 in G.C.Rausser and K.R. Farrell (eds.), Alternative Agricultural and Food Policiesfor the 1985 Farm Bill, Berkeley: Giannini Foundation of AgriculturalEconomics. 1984.

* Just, R.E. and G.C. Rausser."Environmental and Agricultural Policy Linkages and Reforms in

the United States Under the GATT," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, Vol.

74, No. 3 (August 1992) pp. 766-774.

Just, R.E., D.L. Heuth and A. Schmitz. AppliedWelfare Economics and Public Policy. Prentice

Hall, Inc. 1982.

Lichtenberg, E. and D. Zilberman, "The welfareeconomics of price supports in U.S.

agriculture," AmericanEconomic Review 76 (1986), 1135-1141.

Moschini, G.and D.A. Hennessey. "Uncertainty, Risk Aversion and Risk Management for

Agricultural Producers," in Handbook of AgriculturalEconomics, Volume 1. B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier-NorthHolland. 2001.

Rausser,G.C. "Macroeconomics and U.S. Agricultural Policy," in U.S.Agricultural Policy:1985

Farm Legislation, Bruce L. Gardner (ed.). Washington, D.C.: American EnterpriseInstitute for Public Policy Research, 1985, pp. 207-252.

Rausser, G.C., D. Zilberman and R. E. Just. "The Distributional Effects of LandControls in

Agriculture."Western Journal of Agricultural Economics. 9(2) 1984. p.215-232.

* Rausser, G.C., J.A.Chalfant, H.A. Love and K.G. Stamoulis. "Macroeconomic Linkages, Taxes andSubsidies in the U.S. Agricultural Sector," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1986) pp. 399-412.

Rucker, R.R., and W.N.Thurman, "The economic effects of supply controls: the simple analytics ofthe U.S. peanut program," Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990),483-515.

* Schuh, G.E., "TheExchange Rate and U.S. Agriculture," AmericanJournal of Agricultural Economics 56 (1974), 1ö13.

Schultz, T.W., Agriculturein an unstable economy, New York: McGraw Hill. 1945.

Slesnick, D.T.,"Empirical approaches to the measurement of welfare," Journal ofEconomic Literature 36 (1998), 2108-2165.

Stamoulis,K.G. and G.C. Rausser. "Overshooting of Agricultural Prices," in Macroeconomics,

Agriculture, and Exchange Rates, P.L. Paarlberg and Robert G. Chambers (eds.). InternationalAgricultural Trade Research Consortium. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,1988, pp. 163-189.

Sumner,D.A. and C.A. Wolf, "Quotas without supply control: effects of dairy quotapolicy in

California," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 74 (1996), 354-366.

Vercammen, J.A.,"Efficient Area Yield Insurance Contracts," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 82 (4) 2000, pp. 856-864.

* Williams, J."Agricultural Commodity Markets: Spot, Futures, Options, Forward Contractsand Derivatives," in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 1. B.Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Elsevier-North Holland. 2001.

Williams, J., and B.D.Wright, Storage and commodity markets, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress. 1991.

Willig, R.D.,"Consumer's surplus without apology," American Economic Review66 (1976), 589-597.

Wright, B.D. "DynamicPerspectives on Agricultural Policy Issues," Waugh Lecture, AmericanJournal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 75, No 5 (1993), 1113-1125.

Wright, B.D., and J.C.Williams, "The incidence of market stabilizing price supportschemes," Economic Journal 98 (1988), 1183-1198.

MechanismDesign in Public Policy

* Baron, D. ãDesign of Regulatory Mechanisms andInstitutions,ä in R. Schmalensee and R.

Willig,eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization (Vol. 2). New York:North-Holland. 1989.

Baron, D.P., and R.B.Myerson, ãRegulating a Monopolist With Unknown Costs.ä Econometrica

50(1982): 911-930.

Chambers,R.G. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms." AmericanJournal of

Agricultural Economics 74:3 (1992), pp. 646-652. 1992.

* Chambers, R.G. "Information,Incentives and the Design of Agricultural Policies," in Handbook

of Agricultural Economics, B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume 2, Chapter 34, ElsevierNorth Holland, 2002.

Bourgeon, J.-M., and R.G.Chambers, ãStop-And-Go Agricultural Policies.ä American Journal

ofAgricultural Economics 82 (2000), 1-13.

Caillaud, B., R Guesnerie,P. Rey, and J. Tirole ãGovernment Intervention in Production and

IncentivesTheory: A Review.ä Rand Journal of Economics 19 (1988), 1-26.

Chambers, R.G., ãOn theDesign of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms,ä American Journal

ofAgricultural Economics 74 (1992),646-654.

DeMeza, D. and C. Southey,"The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, finance and

entrepreneurship."Economic Journal 106 (1996), 375-86.

Gale, W.,"Collateral, rationing and government intervention in creditmarkets," in G.

Hubbard,ed., Asymmetric information, corporate finance and investment,University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 43-61. 1990.

Grossman, S., and O. Hart,ãAn Analysis of Principal-Agent Problems.ä Econometrica

51(1983), 7-46.

Harris, M., and A. Raviv,ãOptimal Incentives With Imperfect Information.ä Journal of

EconomicTheory 20 (1979), 231-259.

* Innes, R., "Market Failures andSecond-best Analysis, with a Focus on Nutrition, Credit and

Incomplete Markets," in Handbook of Agricultural Economics,B. Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume 2, Chapter 35, ElsevierNorth Holland, forthcoming.

Innes, R.,"Debt futures and options: optimal price-linked financial contracts undermoral hazard

and limited liability," International Economic Review34 (1993) 271-95.

Innes, R.,"Government target price intervention in economies with incompletemarkets,"

Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, (1992) 1035-1052.

Innes, R.,"Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there isasymmetric

information," Journal of Public Economics 46 (1991)347-81.

* Kydland, F.E. and E.C. Prescott,"Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal

Plans." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85 (1977),pp. 473-492.

Laffont, J. and J. Tirole.A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT Press. 1993.

Myerson, R.B., ãIncentiveCompatibility and the Bargaining Problem.ä Econometrica 47

(1979),61-74.

Ramaswami, B., ãSupplyResponse to Agricultural Insurance: Risk Reduction and Moral

Hazard.äAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (1993), 914-925.

Webb, D., "Long termfinancial contracts can mitigate the adverse selection problem in project

financing,"International Economic Review 32 (1991) 305-20.

PoliticalEconomy of Public Policy

* Aaron, H.J., "Politics and theProfessors Revisited." American Economic Review 79

(1989), 1-15.

Alt, J.E.and K.A. Shepsle. Perspectives onPositive Political-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1990.

Anderson, K., "Lobbying incentives and thepattern of protection in rich and poor countries,"

Economic Development and Cultural Change41 (1993), 401-423.

Anderson,K. and Y. Hayami (eds.), The politicaleconomy of agricultural protection: East

Asia in internationalperspective(Allen and Unwin, Sydney, Australia). 1986.

Appelbaum, E. and E. Katz, "Seeking rentsby setting rents: the political economy of rent

seeking," The Economic Journal 97 (1987), 685-699.

* Ball, R. "Interest Groups,Influence and Welfare," Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 119-46.

Barrett, C., "The microeconomics of thedevelopmental paradox: on the political economy

of food pricepolicy," Agricultural Economics20 (1999), 159-172.

* Becker, G.S. "A Theory ofCompetition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,"

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 98, No. 3 (August 1983) pp. 371-400.

* Becker, G.S. "Public Policies,Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," Journal of Public

Economics,December 1985, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 329-347.

Beghin, J.C., "A gametheoretic model of endogenous public policies," American Journal of

AgriculturalEconomics72 (1990), 138-148.

*Beghin, J.C. and W.E. Foster, "Political criterion functions and theanalysis of wealth

transfers," American Journal of Agricultural Economics74 (1992), 787-793.

Beghin, J.C. and L.S. Karp, "Estimation ofprice policies in Senegal: an empirical test of

cooperative gametheory," Journal of DevelopmentEconomics 35 (1991), 49-67.

* Bhagwati, J.N., "DirectlyUnproductive Profit Seeking Activities: A Welfare Theoretic Synthesis

and Generalization." Journal of Political Economy,Vol. 90, pp. 988-1002.

Black, D. TheTheory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1958.

Bowles, S.and H. Gintis, "Power and Wealth in a Competitive CapitalistEconomy,"

Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp.334-353.

Brock, W.A.and S.P. Magee, "Tariff Formation in a Democracy," in CurrentIssues in

International Commercial Policy and Economic Diplomacy, J. Black and B. Hindley

(eds.). London: MacMillan Press, 1979.

Brooks, J.C., A.C. Cameron and C.A. Carter,"Political action committee contributions and

U.S. congressionalvoting on sugar legislation," AmericanJournal of Agricultural

Economics 80 (1998), 441-454.

Brooks, M.A. and B.J. Heijdra, 1989, "Anexploration of rent seeking," TheEconomic Record

188 (1989), 32-50.

Buchanan,J.M. and G. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan

Press, 1962.

Bullock,D.S. "Objectives and Constraints of Government Policy: TheCountercyclicity of

Transfers to Agriculture," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 74 (1992), 617-

29.

* Bullock, D.S., "In Search ofRational Government: What Political Preference Function Studies

Measure and Assume," American Journal of AgriculturalEconomics 76 (1994), 347-361.

* Bullock, D.S., "Are GovernmentTransfers Efficient? An Alternative Test of the Efficient

Redistribution Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy103 (1995), 1236-75.

Cassing, J.H. and A.L. Hillman, "Politicalinfluence motives and the choice between tariffs and

quotas," Journal of International Economics 19(1985), 279-290.

Coggins,J.S., " Rent dissipation and the social cost of price policy," Economics and Politics 7

(1995), 147-166.

Coggins, J.S., T.Graham-Tomasi and T.L. Roe, "Existence of equilibrium in a lobbying

economy," InternationalEconomic Review 32 (1991), 533-550.

deFigueiredo, J.M. and B.S. Silverman, "Academic Earmarks and the Returns toLobbying,"

Massachusetts Institute of Technology working paper.

* de Gorter, H. "Political Economy ofAgricultural Policy," in Handbook of Agricultural

Economics, B.Gardner and G. Rausser (eds.). Volume2, Chapter 36, Elsevier North Holland, 2002.

* de Gorter, H., G.C. Rausser and D.J.Nielson. "Productive and Predatory Public Policies:

Research Expenditures and Producer Subsidies in Agriculture."American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 74, No. 1 (February1992) pp. 27-37.

* de Gorter, H., G.C. Rausser and A.Schmitz. "Rent Seeking and International Trade in

Agriculture," in Agricultural Globalization, Trade, andthe Environment, Moss, C.B., Rausser, G.C., Schmitz, A., Taylor, T.G. andZilberman, D. (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts, 2001.

Dewatripont, M. and G. Roland, " Economicreform and dynamic political constraints," Review of

Economic Studies 59 (1992), 703-30.

Dixit,A., The making of economic policy(The MIT Press, Massachusetts), 1996.

* Dixit, A. and J.Londregan, " Redistributive politics and economic efficiency," American

Political Science Review 89 (1995), 856-866.

* Downs, A. Economic Theory ofDemocracy. New York: Harper, 1957.

Ferejohn,J.A. and B.S. Rundquist. "Observations on a Distributive Theory of PolicyMaking," in

Liske, C., Loehr, W. and McCannant, J. (eds.), ComparativePublic Policy, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1975.

* Foster, W.E. and G.C. Rausser."Price Distorting Compensation Serving the Consumer andÊÊÊÊÊÊÊ Taxpayer Interest." PublicChoice, Vol. 77, No. 2 (October 1993) pp. 275-291.

Foster.W.E., R. Gray, and G.C. Rausser. "Mobility, Diversification, andSustainability of Trade

Reform," in GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy ofPolicy Reform, Gordon C.

Rausser (ed.). Berlin, Heidleberg, New York: Springer-Verlag,1995, Chapter 7, pp. 145-164.

* Gardner, B.L. "EfficientRedistribution through Commodity Markets." American Journal of

Agricultural Economics, May 1983, pp. 225-234.

* Gardner, B.L., "Causes of U.S. FarmCommodity Programs," Journal of Political Economy 95

(1987), 290-310.

Gardner,B.L., "Economic Theory and Farm Politics," American Journal ofAgricultural

Economics 71(1989), 1165-71.

* Grossman, G.M. and E.Helpman, "Protection for sale," TheAmerican Economic Review 84

(1994), 833-850.

* Grossman, G.M. and E.Helpman, "Trade wars and trade talks," Journal of Political Economy

103 (1995), 675-708.

Grossman,G.M. and E. Helpman, Special Interest Politics. The MIT Press,Cambridge, MA and

London UK. 2001.

* Harsanyi, J.C., "A SimplifiedBargaining Model for the N-Person Cooperative Game,"

International Economic Review 4 (1963), 193-220.

* Harsanyi, J.C. Rational Behavior andBargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Hillman,A. L., "Declining industries and political-support protectionistmotives," American Economic Review 72 (1982), 1180-1187.

Hillman,A.L., and J. Riley, 1989, "Politically contestable rents andtransfers," Economics and

Politics 1 (1989), 17-39.

* Jeong, K.S., D.S. Bullock and P. Garcia,"Testing the Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis: An

Application to Japanese Beef Policy," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics

81(2), May 1999: 408-23.

Jessop, B."Recent Theories of the Capitalist State." Cambridge Journal ofEconomics Vol. 1

(1977) pp. 353-373.

*Khanna, J., "Cooperative versus noncooperative behavior: the case ofagricultural research,"

The Review of Economics and Statistics75 (1993), 346-352.

* Krueger, A.O. "The PoliticalEconomy of the Rent-Seeking Society." American Economic

Review Vol.64 (1974) pp. 291-303.

Krueger,A., The political economy of agriculturalpricing policy: a synthesis of the political

economy in developingcountries(Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore), 1992.

* Krueger, A.,"Political economy of agricultural policy," Public Choice 87:1 (1996) 73-175.

Laffont, J.and J. Tirole. "The Politics of Government Decision-making: A Theory ofRegulatory

Capture," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106,No. 4 (November 1991) 1089-1127.

Lewis, T.,R. Ware and R. Feenstra. "Eliminating Price Supports: A Political-Economy

Perspective." Journal of Public Economics.140(1989):159-185.

*L—pez, R.A., "Political economy of U.S. sugar policies," American Journal of Agricultural

Economics 71 (1989), 20-31.

L—pez, R.A. and E. Pagoulatos, "Tradeprotection and the role of campaign contributions in

U.S. food and tobaccoindustries," Economic Inquiry 34(1996), 237-248.

Love, H.A. and G.C. Rausser, "Flexiblepublic policy: the case of the United States Wheat

Sector," Journalof Policy Modeling 19 (1997), 207-236.

Love, H.A.,Rausser, G.C. and D.M. Burton. "Estimating Statistical Properties ofPolitical

Economic Decisions." Unpublished manuscript.

Magee, S.P., W.A. Brock and L. Young, Black hole tariffs and endogenous policytheory:

political economy in general equilibrium(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 1989.

Mayer, W., "Endogenous tariffformation," American Economic Review74 (1984), 970-985.

*Moe, T.M., "Political institutions: the neglected side of the story,"Journal of Law,

Economics, and Organization6 (1990), 213-253.

* Nash, J.F., "The BargainingProblem," Econometrica 18 (1950) pp. 155-162.

* Nash, J.F. "Two Person CooperativeGames." Econometrica 21 (1953) pp. 128-140.

O'Conner, J.The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.

Oehmke, J.F. and X. Yao, "A policypreference function for government intervention in the

U.S. wheatmarket," American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 72 (1990), 631-640.

* Olson, M. The Logic of CollectiveAction. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

1965.

Olson, M., Jr., The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation andsocial

rigidities (Yale UniversityPress, New Haven), 1982.

* Peltzman, S., "Toward a GeneralTheory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 211

(1976), 211-40.

Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, Economic policy, credibility and politics(Harwood Academic

Publishers, Reading),1990.

Persson,T. and G. Tabellini, Political Economics. Political Economics. ExplainingEconomic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000.

Pinstrup-Andersen, P., ed., The political economy of food and nutrition policies (Johns

Hopkins UniversityPress, Baltimore), 1993.

* Rausser, G.C. "Political EconomicMarkets: PESTs and PERTs in Food and Agriculture."

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 64, No. 3 (December 1982) pp. 821

833.

* Rausser, G.C. "Predatory versusProductive Government: The Case of U.S. Agricultural

Policies." Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6(1992), pp. 133-158.

Rausser,G.C. GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of Policy Reform,Springer-Verlag.

Berlin. 1995.

Rausser,G.C. and H. de Gorter. " Endogenizing Policy in Models of AgriculturalMarkets," in

Agriculture and Governments in an Interdependent World, Allen Maunder and Alberto Valdes (eds.).Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference of AgricultureEconomists, Buenos Aires, August 1988. Dartmouth: International Association ofAgricultural Economists, University of Oxford, 1989, pp. 259-274.

Rausser,G.C. and W.E. Foster. "Political Preference Functions and Public PolicyReform,"

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 72, No. 3 (August 1990) pp.642-652.

Rausser,G.C. and W.E. Foster. "Political Preference Functions and Public PolicyReform: A

Reply," American Journal of Agricultural Economics,Vol. 74, No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 227-230.

Rausser,G.C. and J.W. Freebairn. "Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: AnApplication to

U.S. Beef Import Quotas." Review of Economics andStatistics, Vol. 56 (1974), pp. 437-449.

Rausser,G.C. and D. Irwin. "The Political Economy of Agricultural PolicyReform." European

Review of Agricultural Economics (1989), pp. 349-366.

Rausser,G.C., L.K. Simon and K. Van't Veld. "Political Economic Processes and Collective

Decision Making," in Agricultural Competitiveness: MarketForces and Policy, Peters, George H. and Hedley, Douglas D. (eds.).Aldershot, Hants, England and Brookfield, VT, USA: Dartmouth, 1995, pp.261-273.

Rausser,G.C. and P. Zusman. "Political Economy and Alternative Paradigms," inPolitical Power

and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "TheNash Solution to the Bargaining Problem," in Political Power

and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "TheHarsanyi Solution to the Bargaining Problem," in Political

Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Static Political-Economic Analysis," in Political Power and

Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Normative Political-Economic Analysis," in Political Power and

Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Dynamic Political-Economic Analysis," in Political Power and

Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political Power, Ideology and Organizational Structures," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political Power, Influence and Lobbying," in Political Power and

Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "ThePolitical Economy of Commodity Market Intervention," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "ThePolitical Economy of Public Research and Development," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political-Economic Analysis of Redistributive Policy and Public

Good Policy," in Political Power and Endogenous PolicyFormation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Interest Groups, Coalition Breaking, and Productive Policies," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political-Economic Analysis of Land Reform," in Political Power

and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "Political-EconomicAnalysis of Water Resource Systems," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political-Economic Analysis of Trade Liberalization," in Political

Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Political Econometrics," in Political Power and Endogenous

Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman. "ThePolitical Econometrics of the Israeli Dairy Industry," in

Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press(forthcoming).

* Rausser, G.C. and P. Zusman."Normative Political-Econometrics Analysis," in Political Power

and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

Rausser,G.C. and P. Zusman. "Putty-Clay Politics in Transition Economies," inPolitical Power

and Endogenous Policy Formation, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

Rodrik, D., "Political economy of tradepolicy," in: G. Grossman and K. Rogoff

(1990), eds., Handbook of international economics(Elsevier, North-Holland, ÊÊ Amsterdam,New York, and Oxford) 3:1458-1494, 1995.

*Rodrik, D., "Understanding economic policy reform," Journal of Economic Literature 34:9

(1996) 41.

Roemer, J.E."Neoclassicism, Marxism, and Collective Action." Journal ofEconomic Issues, Vol.

12, No. 1 (March 1978), pp. 147-161.

Roemer, J.E. "Value and Politics."Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.1327, Yale

University, September2001.

Roland, G. Transition and Economics:Politics, Markets and Firms. The MIT Press. 2000.

Ruttan, V., "What happened to politicaldevelopment?," Economics Developmentand Cultural

Change (1991) 265-292.

Sarris, A.H., and J.W. Freebairn,"Endogenous price policies and international wheat prices,"

American Journal ofAgricultural Economics 65 (1983), 214-224.

* Steiner, P.O. "The Public Sectorand the Public Interest," in An Analysis and Evaluation of

Public Expenditures: The PPB System. Compendium of papers submitted to theSubcommittee on Economy and Government of the Joint Economic Committee,Congress of the United States, Vol. 1 (1969) pp. 14-65.

* Stigler, G. "The Theory of EconomicRegulation." Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 2 (1971) pp.

3-21.

Swinnen, J., H. de Gorter, G. Rausser and A.Banerjee, "The political economy of public

research investment andcommodity policies in agriculture: an empirical study," Agricultural Economics (1999).

Swinnen, J. and F.A. van der Zee, "Thepolitical economy of agricultural policies: a survey,"

European Review of Agricultural Economics20 (1993), 261-290.

* Tullock, G. "The Welfare Costs ofTariffs, Monopolies and Theft." Western Economics Journal,

Vol. 5 (1967), pp. 224-232.

Tyers, R., "Implicit policy preferences andthe assessment of negotiable trade policy

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